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I. INTRODUCTION
When dealing with allegations of unequal treatment, it has been
the practice to refer to and apply the 'similarly situated' test as
the best way to determine whether a rule or decision breached the
principle of equality.... [The cases reveal] the inadequacy of the
approach where the issue is one of discrimination as opposed to
simple inequality.'
So wrote Judge James Hugessen, judge of the Federal Court of Canada and
of the International Labor Organization Administrative Tribunal (ILOAT),
dissenting from the judgment of the ILOAT in the case known as Mr. R. A.-O.2
That case involved a claim of entitlement to certain benefits for an employee's
same sex domestic partner on the same basis as those benefits were paid to
employee spouses by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO). Judge Hugessen drew a basic distinction between
simple inequality-inconsistent treatment without valid reasons-and true
discrimination in law or administration that offends human dignity or other
norms of equality. Breathing life into this distinction, Judge Hugessen
suggested a new analytical framework for claims of employment
discrimination in the international civil service. In the same way that national
and supranational courts in Europe, North America, and elsewhere are
revisiting the nature and contents of the principle of equality before the law,3
so too, a dialogue about this "ancient and undeniable truth"4 of human
relations has been initiated within the community of tribunals that adjudicate
employment claims brought against public international organizations, such as
Mr. R. A.-O., I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2193, 18 (2003) (Hugessen, J.,
dissenting).
2 Id. In accordance with the practice of most international administrative tribunals, the
tribunals' judgments will be referred to in this article by the plaintiffs' surnames or pseudonyms
given by the tribunals. The alphabetically first plaintiff is used where there have been multiple
plaintiffs in a case.
' See Catherine Barnard & Bob Hepple, Substantive Equality, 59 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 562
(2000) (assessing cases from the United Kingdom, the European Community and the European
Court of Human Rights).
' Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537, 595 (1982). While
conceding the prominence of equality to Western legal and moral thought since Plato and
Aristotle, Westen posits that "[e]quality is an undeniable and unchangeable moral truth because
it is a simple tautology." Id. at 547-48.
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the International Labor Organization (ILO), the United Nations (UN) and the
World Bank.5
This Article examines the similarly situated test for unequal treatment, as
applied by the ILOAT and other international administrative tribunals that
adjudicate employment claims involving public international organizations, in
order to highlight the inadequacies of that test and to elaborate upon Judge
Hugessen's alternative analytical framework.
First, the principal conceptions of equality before the law are briefly
considered. Second, the reader is introduced to the international civil service,
the international administrative tribunals, and the key principles in their
jurisprudence. Third, the tribunals' major decisions under the general
principle of equality are reviewed and compared, with an eye on judicial
approaches to employment discrimination under municipal law primarily in
North America and Europe. Finally, drawing from the established
jurisprudence as well as Judge Hugessen's dissenting opinion in Mr. R.A.-O.,
the author proposes a unifying framework for analyzing cases of both simple
inequality and true discrimination in the international civil service.
II. EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW
A. Conceptions of Equality Under National Constitutions
The principle of equality before the law is a protean concept.6 In the United
States, the first country to give effect to the principle in constitutional
jurisprudence, the guarantee of equality is sometimes viewed as a circular,
empty constraint,7 "a mere tautological recognition" that the law should do
what it intends to do.8 In the United Kingdom and some other parliamentary
democracies in the common law tradition, equality is not a fundamental legal
principle at all, but a right that supreme Parliament may giveth and taketh away
as it will.9 Many continental European constitutions promise equality in its
' See generally 1 C.F. AMERASINGHE, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE
312-16 (2d ed. 1994).
6 Catherine Barnard, The Principle of Equality in the Community Context: P, Grant,
Kalanke and Marschall: Four Uneasy Bedfellows?, 57 CAMBRIDGEL.J. 352,362 (1998) (citing
John Scharr, Equality of Opportunity, and Beyond, in NOMO SIX: EQUALITY (J. Chapman & R.
Pennock eds., 1967)).
7 Cf LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-1, 1436 (2d ed. 1988).
See U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
9 See Arthur Chaskalson, From Wickedness to Equality: The Moral Transformation of
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substantive senses of distributive equality and equal human worth.' ° But in
their application by courts in Europe, these high minded principles sometimes
give way to positivist syllogisms," and in the hard cases, to total judicial
deference for legislative prerogatives. 2 Conversely, courts in the "southern"
democracies like India and South Africa, have tended to embrace and expand
their constitutions' substantive conceptions of equality. 3
For purposes of this Article, the principle of equality is framed as two
distinct legal rights: First, there is the right to equal treatment, addressing what
Judge Hugessen referred to as simple inequality; Second, there is the right to
treatment as an equal. 1" The latter right is one way to address what Judge
Hugessen would call true discrimination. 5
The terminology of "right to treatment as an equal" has not gained currency
in jurisprudence, but the concepts to which it refers-the dignity, autonomy,
and worth of the individual-are seen throughout the cases under the principle
of equality. 6 While this right is a substantive conception of equality, it does
not require equality of results or redistributive justice."
South African Law, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 590, 591 (2003).
1" See Gustavo Zagrebelsky, Ronald Dworkin's Principle Based Constitutionalism: An
Italian Point of View, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 621, 637, 642-43 (2003).
" See id. at 622, 649.
12 See Bernhard Schlink, Hercules in Germany?, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 610, 614-15 (2003)
(Dworkin's anti-positivist thesis that there is one right answer to every legal question is rejected
in German constitutional tradition).
13 See Chaskalson, supra note 9, at 600-01; Upendra Baxi, "A Known But An Indifferent
Judge ": Situating Ronald Dworkin in Contemporary Indian Jurisprudence, 1 INT'L J. CONST.
L. 557, 581-83 (2003).
"4 TRIBE, supra note 7, § 16-1, at 1437-38 (citing Ronald Dworkin, Social Sciences and
Constitutional Rights: The Consequences of Uncertainty, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 3, 10-11 (1977)).
Although the tribunals' judgments interchangeably use "principle" and "right" as well as
"equality" and "equal treatment," this Article considers equal treatment to be one of the rights
that flows from the principle of equality.
" A possible third iteration of the principle of equality-the right of
nondiscrimination-may be viewed instead as a framework for enforcement of either or both of
the two other rights. Discrimination requires a breach of either equal treatment or the right to be
treated as an equal, but it is possible to have infringements of equal treatment or the right to be
treated as an equal without infringing any particular right of nondiscrimination. See Barnard,
supra note 6, at 355, 363-64.
16 See Deborah L. Brake, When Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off: The Problem of
Leveling Down in Equality Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 513, 563 (2004).
" See TRIBE, supra note 7, § 16-1, at 1438 n.18.
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The right to equal treatment is the widely recognized conception of
equality. 8 It is a formalistic right, requiring consistent treatment, aiming for
procedural justice, but not necessarily seeking a moral or substantively correct
outcome. 9 The right to equal treatment condones bad treatment as long as like
persons are treated equally badly.2° Some scholars would reframe equal
treatment as a positive right to be treated reasonably under one's own
circumstances.2" As such, the abstract right to equal treatment says little about
the attendant obligations of the lawmaker or the administrator of the law,
because it is rare that laws or administrative actions are wholly arbitrary.22.
B. Conceptions of Equality in International Administrative Tribunals
For more than thirty years, the right to equal treatment has been part of the
jurisprudence of international administrative tribunals like the ILOAT.23 They
have used the quintessentially formalist similarly situated test for analyzing all
claims of inequality and discrimination in employment.24 Under the test, "[t]he
principle of equality means that those in like case[s] should be treated alike,
and that those who are not in like case[s] should not be treated alike."25 Where
an individual plaintiff or class of persons is similarly situated to another whom
the employer has treated differently, then unequal treatment cannot stand.2 6
But where the plaintiff and his comparator are not similarly situated, then there
is no unequal treatment, and on the contrary, the organization may be required
to treat the two persons differently.27 The similarly situated test has worked
reasonably well in cases of simple inequality in the international organizations,
that is, a lack of evenhandedness in the administration of the terms and
conditions of employment.28 But where the issue was one of systematic
18 See generally Barnard, supra note 6.
'9 Barnard & Hepple, supra note 3, at 563.
20 Id. See generally Brake, supra note 16.
21 Westen, supra note 4, at 576-77 ("[I]f rationality review has merit, it is not because the
state is constitutionally obliged to have rational reasons for treating people 'unalike' (as opposed
to 'alike') but because the state is obliged to have [a] rational and legitimate reason for every way
in which it treats people.") (emphasis in original).
22 RICHARD CLAYTON & HUGH TOMuNsON, THE LAW OF HUMAN RGHTS 1204 (2000).
23 See 1 AMERASINGHE, supra note 5, at 314-16.
24 See id. at 316.
25 De Los Cobos, I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 391, 9 (1980).
26 See 1 AMERASINGHE, supra note 5, at 316.
27 See id.
28 See generally id. at 328-41.
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discrimination-institutionalized unequal treatment on the basis of personal
characteristics that may be irrelevant to employment-then the similarly
situated test has proved inadequate.29
Over the years, in discrete extensions of the traditional similarly situated
test the international administrative tribunals have begun to sketch out
substantive approaches to analyzing claims of employment discrimination in
the international civil service which include concepts of equality of
opportunity and of nondiscrimination against designated categories.3" Judge
Hugessen's dissenting opinion in Mr. R.A.-O. sought to synthesize some of
those disparate judgments into a new analytical framework that would
vindicate the right to treatment as an equal.3 He envisaged a substantive
conception of equality that is driven by such values as the dignity, autonomy,
and worth of the individual person.32
Judge Hugessen's approach mirrors the constitutional jurisprudence in
Canada and also the current legal trends in some European courts to recognize
something like the right to treatment as an equal. 33 Those relatively recent
developments in jurisprudence outside the United States recall the journey of
American case law from Justice Harlan's lonely dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson
to Chief Justice Warren's opinion for a unanimous court in Brown v. Board of
Education, both of which emphasized the autonomy and worth of the
individual as an essential aspect of the principle of equality before the law.34
International administrative tribunals are on a similar journey today.
29 Mr. R.A.-O., I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2193, 18 (2003) (Hugessen, J.,
dissenting).
30 See Barnard & Hepple, supra note 3, at 565-66.
3' Mr. R.A.-O., I.L.O. No. 2193, 21-27 (Hugessen, J., dissenting).
32 Id.
33 See Barnard & Hepple, supra note 3, at 567.
3' Bob Hepple, The European Legacy of Brown v. Board of Education, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV.
605,610-11 (2006). See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("There is no caste here. Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is
the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his
surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land
are involved."); Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) ("To
separate [students] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.").
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III. THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE AND INTERNATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS
The employees of international organizations traditionally have been
considered to be international civil servants, that is, public servants to the
international community.35 Judicially created rules of employment law within
international organizations have been heavily influenced by the law of public
administration, and less so by private employment law.36 Consequently,
allegations of employment discrimination in international organizations are
analyzed by their respective tribunals using a framework that broadly applies
to other forms of discrimination in government administration, as discussed
below.
A. Public International Organizations and International Administrative
Tribunals
Starting in 1865, with the establishment of the International Telegraph
Union (now the International Telecommunication Union), states have
established international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) to serve
public purposes that were seen as best achieved on a transnational basis.37
Today, the United States recognizes more than eighty IGOs,38 and there are
many others.
IGOs are typically bestowed with immunity from the jurisdiction of
member states' courts to preserve their independence and international
character.3 As a corollary of this jurisdictional immunity, the employees of
these organizations-the international civil service-have no recourse under
" For a brief summary of the origins of the international civil service, from the Congress of
Vienna (1814-15) to the League of Nations, see Aamir Ali, The International Civil Service: The
Idea and the Reality, in INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION: LAW AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 1. 1 (Chris de Cooker ed., 1990). For a more comprehensive
review, see JACQUE LEMOINE, THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVANT: AN ENDANGERED SPECIES
15-27 (1995).
36 See 1 AMERASINGHE, supra note 5, at 176.
3" See LEMOINE, supra note 35, at 21.
38 See 22 U.S.C. § 288, Notes (2000). In addition, the European Union is comprised of
numerous constituent organizations. See Europa, How is the EU Organized?, http://europa.
eu/abc/panarama/howorganized/index-en.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
" See generally Charles H. Bower, II, International Immunities: Some Dissident Views on
the Role of Municipal Courts, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2000).
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national laws regulating employment.40 Enter the international administrative
tribunals, which over time have been established by various international
organizations to provide judicial review of the acts by the organizations as
employers.41
1. International Labor Organization Administrative Tribunal
The oldest and most prolific of the existing tribunals is the ILOAT.
Established in 1946 as the successor to the League of Nations Tribunal (1927
to 1946), the ILOAT has decided over 2,600 cases as of February 2007,
recently averaging about 100 judgments per year.42
Although it is formally an organ of the ILO, other IGOs can accept the
jurisdiction of the ILOAT, and the tribunal currently has jurisdiction over
employment claims from forty-nine international organizations. 43  These
include UN specialized agencies such as the Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO), UNESCO, and the World Health Organization (WHO),
as well as other organizations like Interpol and the World Trade Organization
(WTO). 4 The ILOAT has jurisdiction over organizations that are part of the
UN common system, organizations that track the coordinated organizations,
as well as organizations that do not participate in any coordinated employment
policies.45  A common denominator of the organizations that accept the
40 While it is not unheard of for a national court to exercise jurisdiction over international
organizations in employment cases, such cases have been the rare exception. See 1
AMERASINGHE, supra note 5, at 45.
"' For a detailed analysis of the need for and origins of the international administrative
tribunals, see id. at 26-48. See also Kay Hailbronner, Immunity of International Organisations
from National Jurisdiction, with particular reference to Germany, in INTERNATIONAL
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 35, at 111.3 (reviewing German constitutional jurisprudence
suggesting the immunity of international organizations with respect to employment relations is
conditional upon the availability of effective judicial protection, as provided by international
administrative tribunals). The International Court of Justice affirmed the judicial character of
international administrative tribunals, in Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United
Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. 47, 52 (Jul. 13).
42 See International Labor Organization, Triblex http://www.ilo.org/dyn/triblex/triblexbr
owse.home (last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
43 See Organizations Under the Jurisdiction ofthe ILOAT, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
tribunal/orgs.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2007).
44Id.
4 The UN, the ILO, the World Health Organization (WHO) and a dozen other IGOs have
agreed to develop common standards for salaries, benefits and other terms of employment,
known as the "UN common system." See Jacques Tassin, Administrative Coordination in the
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ILOAT'sjurisdiction is that they are headquartered in Europe orNorth Africa,
although they employ staff worldwide. 6
The seven judges of the ILOAT are appointed for three year renewable
terms by the ILO Conference, the highest organ of the ILO.4 The judges are
of different nationalities and typically have been eminent jurists in their
countries.4" Usually, they sit in panels of three, but larger panels are permitted
for exceptional cases.49
2. United Nations Administrative Tribunal
The United Nations Administrative Tribunal (UNAT) was established in
New York in 1949 to receive complaints from the UN and the UN specialized
agencies." A number of specialized agencies based in Europe elected to
accept the jurisdiction of the ILOAT, as noted above,5' rather than that of the
UNAT 2 Two other specialized agencies, the World Bank and the IMF, chose
neither tribunal and established their own administrative tribunals much later. 3
The UNAT's jurisdiction includes employment claims from the UN
Secretariat, several UN agencies and programs including the UN Children's
Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the International Maritime Organization (IMO),
UN Family, in INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 35, at 1/25. The "coordinated
organizations" are NATO and five other IGOs based in Europe that have agreed to coordinate
their salary-setting policies. Their coordination does not extend to other terms of employment.
See Walter Ftirst & Helge Weber, Uniformity in Service Law and Judicial Remedies for Staff
Members of the European Coordinated Organisations, in INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION,
supra note 35, at V.1/1-3.
' The WHO, for example, is based in Geneva but has a highly decentralized structure with
offices around the world, and the WHO also includes the Pan-American Health Organization,
a distinct international organization headquartered in Washington. See About the WHO, http://
www.who.int/about/structure/en/index.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
17 Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labor Organization art. III,
Oct. 9, 1946, as amended through June 16, 1998, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
tribunal/Stateng.htm.
48 See Members ofthe Administrative Tribunal, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/tribunal/ju
dges.htm (last visited July 6, 2007).
41 Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labor Organization, supra
note 47, art. III.
o See generally I AMERASINGHE, supra note 5, at 54-57.
SI See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
52 1 AMERASINGHE, supra note 5, at 60.
53 Id.
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the International Civil Aviation Organization,54 and claims for pension benefits
from a host of IGOs that participate in the UN Joint Staff Pension Fund. 5
Like the ILOAT, the UNAT is comprised of seven judges of different
nationalities, who sit in panels of three.56 They are appointed for four year
renewable terms by the UN General Assembly. The UNAT has decided more
than a thousand cases. 7
3. Other Tribunals
Until 1988, legal claims by employees of the organizations comprising the
European Union were heard by the European Court of Justice (ECJ).5"
Subsequently, those claims were heard by the Court of First Instance until the
Civil Service Tribunal was established in 2005."9 The judges of all three
tribunals are appointed by the European Council of member states, for
renewable terms of three to six years.60
Several other IGOs have elected to establish their own administrative
tribunals. Among the IFIs, notable examples are the World Bank
Administrative Tribunal (WBAT),6' the Administrative Tribunal of the Asian
14 Id. at 57.
" Id. The UN Joint Staff Pension Fund is a multi-employer pension fund of which FAO,
ILO, WHO and other organizations are members, in addition to the UN Secretariat. See
generally UN Joint StaffPension Fund, http://www.unjspf.org (last visited Oct. 16,2007). Thus,
staff of the ILO would take their complaints about the pension fund to the UNAT and all other
employment complaints to the ILOAT. Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the U.N., G.A.
Res. 351(IV), art. 14(2), adopted Nov. 24, 1949, as amended through Dec. 12, 2000, available
at http://www.un.org/staff/panelofcounsel/pocimages/atstat.pdf [hereinafter UNAT Statute].
56 UNAT Statute, supra note 55, art 3.
7 See Numerical Index of Administrative Tribunal Judgments As ofNovember 2005, http://
www.un.org/staff/panelofcounsel/xatjnum.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2007). The UNAT and other
elements of the UN's internal system of administrative justice recently have been the subject of
a comprehensive review and recommendations for change. See REPORT OF THE REDESIGN PANEL
ON THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATION OFJUSTICE, U.N. doc. A/61/205 (July 28,
2006); The Secretary General, Note on the Report of the Redesign Panel on the United Nations
System ofAdministration of Justice, U.N. Doc. A61/758 (Feb. 23, 2007).
58 See CURIA, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: HISTORIC
LANDMARKS, BUILDINGS, AND SYMBOLS 4, http://curia.europa.eu/instit/services/dpi/historiq.pdf
(last visited July 6, 2007). The ECJ is formally called the Court of Justice of the European
Communities.
59 Id. at 5.
60 See ECJ, FAQ's, http://curia.europa.eu/en/instit/Services/dpil/faq2.htm#cjce (last visited
Sept. 24, 2007).
61 The WBAT was established in 1980 and has decided more than 360 cases. See Judgments
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Development Bank (AsDBAT),62 and the International Monetary Fund
Administrative Tribunal (IMFAT).63 Similarly, among the coordinated
organizations in Europe, there are administrative tribunals or equivalent
appeals boards, notably at the Council of Europe, NATO, and the Organisation
for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD).64
B. General Principles of Employment Discrimination Law
It is widely accepted that public international organizations are bound by
the principle of equality in their employment relations.65 While some would
contend that this broad principle is jus cogens under international law, and
therefore, compulsory for all subjects of international law, the jurisprudence
does not support that conclusion as to international organizations.66 Rather, the
principle of equality and the right to equal treatment became part of the
internal employment law of international organizations through specific
judgments of the international administrative tribunals, many of which are
reviewed in this Article. 67 These judgments are premised on the view that the
employment rules and actions of these intergovernmental organizations have
an administrative character, and therefore, should be constrained by the general
& Orders, http://wbtnOOl8.worldbank.org/cm/wbt/wbtwebsite.nsf/(decisiondateweb)?OpenView
(last visited July 6, 2007).
62 Dating to 1991, the Statute of the AsDBAT is patterned after the WBAT Statute. The
tribunal has decided seventy-seven cases as of August 2006. See ADBT Decisions by Number,
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/ADBT/number.asp (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
63 The IMFAT was formally established in 1994 and has decided twenty-one cases on the
merits. See IMF Administrative Tribunal: Judgments, http://www.imf.org/external/imfat/index.
htm (last visited July 6, 2007).
64 1 AMERASINGHE, supra note 5, at 57-59, 62.
65 Id. at 315-16.
6 Compare Advisory Opinion OC- 18/03, Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented
Migrants, Inter-Am. C.H.R. § 101 (Sept. 17, 2003) (concluding that the "principle of equality
before the law, equal protection before the law and non-discrimination [in terms of labor rights]
belongs tojus cogens"), with Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Rights of Migrant Workers One Year
On: Transformation or Consolidation?, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 113, 136 (2004) (commenting that
the Inter-American Court's pronouncement is "unlikely true ... as regards the entire list of
unacceptable grounds of discrimination").
67 See Dadivas, I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 60 (1962); Press, I.L.O. Admin. Trib.,
Judgment No. 66 (1962); but cf. 1 AMERASINGHE, supra note 5, at 315 (because tribunal
judgments do not extensively or specifically discuss the basis of the law of equal treatment, it
"would not be unrealistic to conclude" that the tribunals have implicitly regarded general
principles of law as the source of this law).
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principles of law-consistency and evenhandedness-that commonly restrain
public administration at the national level.68
There is no single body of employment law for IGOs. Each organization
has its own internal employment law comprised of both written and unwritten
sources of law.69 The written sources of law include, first and foremost, the
constitutive instrument of the organization, for example, the UN Charter or the
Articles of Agreement of the IMF.7° Secondarily, staff regulations and other
terms of employment have been established by the high legislative organs of
the IGOs, such as the UN General Assembly and the IMF Executive Board,
and by the organizations' chief executives, like the Secretary General of the
UN and the Managing Director of the LMF. 7 1
Only a minority of IGOs' Constitutive treaties acknowledge the principle
of equality and particular antidiscrimination norms. Article 8 of the UN
Charter specifically rules out sex discrimination in employment at the UN, and
Article 1 of the Charter provides more broadly that the purposes of the
organization include international cooperation in "promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 72 IGOs that lack such treaty-
based norms adopted equivalent prohibitions against employment
discrimination in some of their earliest legislative acts. Typical of these broad
norms was Rule N-I of the IMF Staff Regulations, dating to 1946, which
provided that "the employment, classification, promotion and assignment of
persons on the staff of the Fund shall be made without discriminating against
any person because of sex, race, or creed."73
Such general pronouncements leave many procedural and substantive
aspects of discrimination law unaddressed. None of the IGOs have
comprehensive legislation governing claims for employment discrimination in
the ilk of Title VII of the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964, the UK Race Relations
68 See 1 AMERASINGHE, supra note 5, at 314-15.
69 E.g., Report of the Executive Board to the Board of Governors of the International
Monetary Fund, EBAP/92/147, Attachment II, Oct. 9, 1992, reprinted in I Int'l Mon. Fund
Admin. Trib. Rep's 251, App. at 17-18 (2000) [hereinafter IMFAT Report]. See also Robert
A. Gorman, The Development of International Employment Law: My Experience on
International Administrative Tribunals at the World Bankand the Asian Development Bank, 25
COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 423 (2004).
70 See IMFAT Report, supra note 69, at 17-18.
7' See id.
72 U.N. Charter art. 8, 1.
" IMF By Laws R. & Regs. NI (1969). In 1979, this regulation was amended slightly and
renamed Rule N-2.
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Acts of 1968, or the Canadian Human Rights Act of 1976. In confining their
anti-discrimination legislation to high principles, the equality law of the IGOs
is not unlike many of the continental European systems, in which broad
constitutional provisions and penal law traditionally have been the primary
protections against employment discrimination.74
International agreements are among the written sources of non-binding but
persuasive law,75 including Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (1966),76 Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights," and Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.78
The unwritten sources of law for an organization are its own administrative
practice, which may give rise to legal rights, and the so-called "general
principles" of international administrative law.79 It is through deployment of
these general principles that international administrative tribunals have
wielded considerable judicial authority over the development of employment
law, especially the principle of equality, in the international civil service.
14 See generally Gabrielle S. Friedman &JamesQ. Whitman, The European Transformation
of Harassment Law: Discrimination Versus Dignity, 9 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 241 (2003). Under
recent directives of the European Council, including Directive 2000/78, establishing a general
framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, states of the European Union are
required to provide effective civil law remedies for employment discrimination. See Council
Directive, 2000/78, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16.
1l Mr. I.M.B., I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2120, 10 (2002); Mr. R.A.-O., I.L.O.
Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2193, 14-15 (2003) (Hugessen, J., dissenting).
76 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 26, G.A. Res 2200A(XXI), U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ("All persons are
equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the
law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal
and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, color, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.").
" Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 2, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, Supp.
No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) (Article 2 begins "[e]veryone is entitled to all the
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status").
78 European Convention on Human Rights art. 14, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. 5, 213
U.N.T.S. 221 ("The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority,
property, birth or other status.").
" IMFAT Report, supra note 69, at 17, 19. See Gorman, supra note 69, at 429-30.
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1. General Principles in the International Court of Justice
In public international law, "the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations" are referred to as a source of law in Article 38 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ),8" and before that, Article 38 of the
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) (1921-1945)."8
In spite of concerns that tribunals would expand the scope of international law
beyond that which states consented, these provisions recognized that an
international court must be given some power to develop an international
jurisprudence.82
By design, the scope of these "general principles of law" were ill-defined,
and reflected a disagreement among the drafters as to whether general
principles extended to natural law concepts grounded in conscience and
subjective morality.83 The PCIJ and the ICJ, as well as early ad hoc
international arbitral tribunals, had been conservative in their reliance upon
general principles, mainly referring to principles of legal procedure such as
estoppel and res judicata and only rarely invoking more substantive maxims
such aspacta sunt servanda,84 unjust enrichment, equity (abuse of rights), and
respect for acquired rights (vested rights).85
Indeed, there appears to be not a single case in which the ICJ has invoked
general principles in the natural law sense, nor could a case be found in which
the ICJ has referred to equality as a general principle of law.86 However, in a
"0 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No.
993.
"I Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice art. 38, Dec. 16, 1920, 6 L.N.T.S.
379.
82 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (5th ed. 1998); see also
Wolfgang Friedmann, The Uses of "General Principles " in the Development of International
Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 279, 280 (1963).
83 BROWNLIE, supra note 82, at 15-16. For a summary of the scholarship discussing the
narrowness or breadth of the concept of general principles under the ICJ statute, see Erika de
Wet, Judicial Review as an Emerging General Principle of Law and Its Implications for the
International Court of Justice, XLVII NETH. INT'L L. REV. 181, 185-88 (2000).
" Signifying that the agreements and stipulations of the parties to a contract must be
observed. West's Encyclopedia of America Law, http://www.enotes.com/wests-law-encyclope
dia/pacta-sunt-servanda.
85 Friedmann, supra note 82, at 287; BROWNLIE, supra note 82, at 17-18; Lord McNair, The
Generalized Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 18
(1957).
86 But cf Barcelona Traction (Second Phase) (Bel. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (the right to
protection from racial discrimination has become erga omnes, deriving from principles and rules
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widely-cited dissenting opinion in the South West Africa case, Judge Kotaro
Tanaka, former justice in the Supreme Court of Japan, concluded that equality
before the law, and in particular non-discrimination based on race, is a
universal legal norm under international conventions, international custom, and
general principles of law.87
It has been noted that, whereas the ICJ's failure to make significant use of
general principles as a source for developing the state of international law may
relate to that tribunal's dependence upon the consent of states for jurisdiction
and the acceptability of its decisions and opinions, such an inhibition need not
apply to tribunals operating in other, newer spheres of international law.88
Indeed, scholars recognized early on that the rapid development of new areas
of international law, specifically, for international commercial transactions and
for the administrative law of international organizations, calls for a liberal
approach to general principles as a source of law.89
2. General Principles and Equality in the French Conseil d'Etat
The concept of general principles of law features prominently in French
administrative law, the body of municipal law that has been more influential
than any other upon the jurisprudence of international administrative
tribunals.9" Taking the concept far beyond that seen in the ICJ, France's
Conseil d'Etat has adopted many general principles of law to protect individual
rights from the power of the administrative state, and to enforce the rule of law
in the absence of legislative or constitutional constraints.9" These principles
include equality before the law, essential individual liberties, and the judicial
review.92 Such protections are closely analogous to those in the Bill of Rights
and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
concerning basic human rights).
87 South West Africa Cases (Second Phase) (Eth. v. S. Aft.; Liber. v. S. Aft'.), 1966 I.C.J.
6, 300 (July 18) (Tanaka, J., dissenting).
88 Friedmann, supra note 82, at 280-81.
9 Id. at 281; see also McNair, supra note 85, at 1.
90 L. NEVIL.LE BROWN & JOHN S. BELL, FRENCH ADMINSTRATwE LAW 3 (5th Ed. 1998). See
I AMERASINGUE, supra note 5, at 49, 277.
91 See BROWN & BELL, supra note 90, at 216-17. The French judiciary is comprised of two
parallel branches, the judicial courts that have jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters, and
the administrative courts that handle public law matters. The Conseil d'ttat is the highest
administrative court. See id. at 9.
92 Id. at 219-20.
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Amendment to the United States Constitution." In France, the 1958
Constitution of the Fifth Republic does not express these individual rights, but
they have been declared general principles of law by the French administrative
courts, derived from such sources as the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man
and the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution of the Fourth Republic.
94
Additionally, general principles of due process and equality were derived
by the Conseil d'Etat from the natural law philosophy of the Enlightenment,95
and were also the inspiration for principles of equality in the United States
Declaration of Independence and Constitution. Derived as they are from
natural law, these principles have carried moral as well as legal connotations.96
Without this natural law element, the principle of equality in the hands of an
administrative court could never reach beyond a rule of evenhandedness in
government administration, a rule of equal treatment in the most literal sense.
This subjective element to general principles has been much criticized in
France, with references to "activist" judges and "American-style" judicial
review.9 7 But it is clear that the Conseil d'Etat has retained a moral, natural
justice element in the principle of equality, allowing the principle to be used
by the court at times to pursue social justice.
The first case in the Conseil d'ttat applying the general principle of
equality in the civil service was Barel, in 1954.98 The five plaintiffs had been
refused the opportunity to sit for the entry examination for the Ecole Nationale
d'Administration, and no explanation was given. On appeal, the plaintiffs
argued that the motive for the refusal was that they were Communists. When
the minister responsible declined to give a reason for the refusal or to produce
the relevant files to the court, the Conseil d'ltat accepted the plaintiff's
argument as to motive, and ruled that this violated the general principles of
freedom of opinion and equal access to the civil service.99 The court could
have reached the same outcome simply by reference to the authority's failure
93 See id. at 220.
9 Id. at 218. For a discussion of the natural law underpinnings of such instruments as the
United States Declaration of Independence, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, see CLAYTON& TOML[NSON, supra note
22, at 22-24.
95 BROWN & BELL, supra note 90, at 218.
96 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON-LAW WORLD 212
(1954).
9' See id. at 213-14.
9' CE, May 28, 1954, Rec. Lebon 308.
99 SCHWARTZ, supra note 96, at 255.
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to provide adequate reasons.100 But by invoking the principle of equality, the
Conseil d'ttat signaled its determination to use the principle not merely for
administrative evenhandedness but in the active pursuit ofjustice.
This is further illustrated in the cases of Peynet, from 1973, and Ville de
Toulouse, from 1982, where the Conseil d'Etat extended private sector job
protections to cover public civil servants. In Peynet,l0 l by invoking general
principles, the court extended to civil servants a rule protecting pregnant
women from dismissal in the private sector.10 2 In Ville de Toulouse,10 3 the
Conseil d'Etat invoked general principles to extend the private sector
minimum wage to public sector casual laborers."° Both of these outcomes
were controversial in France and they demonstrated the degree to which
general principles could be invoked to expand substantive protections under
the rubric of equality.10 5
3. The General Principle of Equal Treatment in the International
Administrative Tribunals
In the same year as the Barel decision from the Conseil d'1ttat, the ILOAT
for the first time referred to its implicit power to invoke principles of equity to
provide clarity to the staff regulations of an international organization. 6 This
was followed by judgments invoking such maxims as estoppel and patere
legem.1°7 In 1962, in the cases of Dadivas and Press, the ILOAT for the first
10' The Conseil d'ttat, at the urging of Judge Maxime Letourneur, who would later serve on
the ILOAT, had recently overturned the long-standing precedent which held that the
administration was not required to give reasons for its decisions unless specifically required by
statute. SCHWARTZ, supra note 96, at 211.
'0' CE, June 8, 1973, Rec. Lebon 406.
102 BROWN & BELL, supra note 90, at 211.
103 CE, April 23, 1982, Rec. Lebon 152.
104 BROWN & BELL, supra note 90, at 228.
105 See id.
106 Tranter, I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 14 (1954) ("[T]he Judge is bound to observe
strictly the rules of law and can have recourse to equity only in the event of lack of clarity of the
text or silence of the regulations.").
07 E.g., Waghorn, I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 28 (1957) ("[T]he complainant, by
accepting on several occasions and without reservation the payments made to him by the
Organisation, in sizable and generous amounts, may be considered under general principles of
law as having acquiesced in the actual offers which were made to him and as having relinquished
the remainder of his claims."); D'Andecy, I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 51 (1960) ("Any
authority is bound by its own rules for so long as such rules have not been amended or
abrogated."); Wakley, I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 53 (1961) ("[T]he general principle
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time invoked equality as a general principle of law, thereby resolving any
doubt as to whether, in cases between an IGO and its staff, the concept of
general principles would be limited to those recognized by the ICJ." 8 Not
coincidentally, the vice-president of the ILOAT at this time was Maxime
Letourneur, judge in the Conseil d'ttat and noted expert on general principles
of law.'09
As a rule, however, the international tribunals have been more conservative
than the French Conseil d'ettat in their resort to the general principle of
equality. The cases reviewed below demonstrate that the tribunals usually
avoided invoking the principle in the sense of the right to treatment as an
equal. As traditionally applied, the tribunals' "similarly situated" construct for
analyzing claims for equal treatment insisted on evenhandedness and not
natural justice."'
Before closing this introduction to the international administrative
tribunals, it should be noted that the tribunals are not bound by each others'
judgments. As explained by the Administrative Tribunal of the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRDAT):
The jurisprudence developed by the administrative tribunals of
international organisations is a prime source for the general
principles of international administrative law. This does not
mean that one administrative tribunal is bound to follow the
approach let alone the particular decision of another tribunal. On
the other hand, it does mean that the reasoning of other
administrative tribunals is persuasive."'
of law according to which the payer is entitled to pursue the recovery against the payee of sums
paid in error is applicable to the present case.").
'0' Dadivas, I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 60 (1962); Press, I.L.O. Admin. Trib.,
Judgment No. 66 (1962) ("[T]he organisation is bound to respect the principle of equality as
between officials in the same position . .
'09 See supra note 100.
"0 The courts of the EU have been notably more willing than the international administrative
tribunals at other IGOs to apply substantive concepts of equality in order to expand the scope
of statutory rights of non-discrimination into general rights applicable in contexts not
contemplated under the statutes. For example, in the case of Speybrouck, on facts similar to
those in Peynet from the French court, the EU's Court of First Instance extended to the staff of
the EU organizations thejob protections for pregnancy found in a directive aimed at the Member
States. Case T-45/90, Speybrouck v. European Parliament, 1992 E.C.R. 11-33.
.. Mr. C, European Bank for Reconstruction & Dev. (E.B.R.D.) Admin. Trib., Decisions
No. 01/03 (2003).
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When tribunals invoke general principles of law, the need for consistency
with the jurisprudence from other tribunals is compelling because the
legitimacy of general principles depends on the premise that they are "so
widely accepted and well-established in different legal systems that they are
regarded as generally applicable to all decisions taken by international
organizations.""' 2  The constant tension between, on the one hand, the
application of the general principle of equality by different tribunals in
disparate circumstances, and, on the other hand, the preservation of the
legitimacy of the principle through its coherence, is seen throughout the
judgments discussed below.
IV. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF EQUALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS
This part first explains the elements of the traditional similarly situated test.
Second, cases applying the test in the international administrative tribunals are
considered, with an emphasis on the tribunals' explicit and implicit
innovations to the test in response to the analytical difficulties that have arisen.
Finally, recent cases that have departed from the traditional test are considered
in light of the need for a more robust legal framework.
A. The Similarly Situated Test
The principle of equality means that those in like case should be
treated alike, and that those who are not in like case should not
be treated alike." 3
This is the classic formulation of the right to equal treatment, long
recognized by international administrative tribunals as one of the general
principles of international administrative law. This formulation, which is said
to come "straight out of Aristotle,"'" 4 also has been invoked by the ECJ as a
general principle under Community Law." 5
112 IMFAT Report, supra note 69, at 18.
... De Los Cobos, I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 391 9 (1980).
14 Sean Pager, Strictness vs. Discretion: The European Court of Justice's Variable Vision
of Gender Equality, 51 AM. J. CoMP. L. 553, 555 (2003). See Barnard, supra note 6, at 363.
... E.g., Case 80/70, Defrenne v. Bel., 1971 E.C.R. 445.
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The similarly situated test is marked by three notable characteristics: (1)
Prejudice is not a factor in the analysis; the test applies equally to intentional
and unintended discrimination and to any category of persons; (2) Because the
test does not protect any particular categories of persons, it is open to a
plaintiff to put himself into any relevant category and compare his treatment
to that of others in the category; (3) In making such a comparison, the
plaintiff's circumstances must be nearly identical to those of the persons who
were treated differently; otherwise, the tribunals will find that the plaintiff was
not similarly situated to his comparators, and thus, the differential treatment
did not infringe the right to equal treatment.'16 These three characteristics, and
their application in the cases, are explained next.
1. Prejudice Is Not a Factor
The similarly situated test for equal treatment was never concerned with
prejudice. In the international administrative tribunals, as in the French
Conseil d'Etat, claims of biased motive are analyzed as an abuse of power
(d~tournement de pouvoir), or what English courts would call bad faith or
improper purpose." 7  Scholars and tribunals occasionally refer to
ddtournement de pouvoir in a broader sense that includes abuse of power
through discrimination and unequal treatment."' But in its usual sense, the
doctrine applies more narrowly to ill will, personal prejudice, and irrelevant
considerations in individual decisions)' 9 When invoking the doctrine of
ditournement de pouvoir in its usual sense, the tribunals have engaged in a
burden-shifting analysis that requires plaintiffs to produce some evidence
giving rise to at least an inference of improper motivation, to which the
organization can respond with its own proof of proper motive. 20 Tribunals
usually will rule for the plaintiffs in such mixed-motive cases, where there is
116 See generally 1 AMERASINGHE, supra note 5, at 314, 335-37, 339.
117 Id. at 278.
11' E.g., C.F. Amerasinghe, Dotournement de Pouvoir in International Administrative Law,
4 Zao. R. V. 439, 440-62 (1984) (Ger.).
"9 Id. at 467.
120 See id. at 475-79 (citing, e.g., Olivares Silva, I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 495
(1982) (plaintiffs burden is to show it is more probable than not that a bias against him for his
activities in the staff association was a factor in the decision-maker's mind; prejudice is usually
concealed, so it's existence may be proven by inference)).
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credible evidence that ill-will, prejudice or some other improper motive was
a factor, even if not the predominant factor, in the decisionmaker's mind.12'
Cases of systemic differential treatment traditionally were not analyzed as
dtournement depouvoir, and the tribunals avoided probing the organization's
proffered purposes for the differentiation. Even where plaintiffs claimed that
prejudice, such as gender bias, was at play in the differential treatment, the
tribunals originally applied the similarly situated test no more stringently than
in cases of simple inequality.'22 Reinforcing the conclusion that the traditional
similarly situated test was concerned solely with administrative
evenhandedness and not human rights and dignity, the jurisprudence of the
ECJ applies the same similarly situated test to all manner of administrative acts
under Community Law, from employment discrimination, to tariffs, to
advertising laws.'23
As a rule of evenhandedness controlling the exercise of government
authority, the similarly situated test of equal treatment may be viewed as a
particular application of the Wednesbury unreasonableness test under English
law,' 24 and the rational basis test for equal protection under the United States
Constitution.'25 A key difference, however, is that bad faith is explicitly an
element of the Wednesbury test, and prejudice can be a consideration under the
121 E.g., Olivares Silva, I.L.O. No. 495, 23. But see Suntharalingam, W.B. Admin. Trib.,
Decision No. 6, 29 (1981) (evidence of irritation by supervisor with plaintiff's unsatisfactory
performance does not give rise to an inference that prejudice or discrimination was a factor in
the decision to terminate employment).
122 See generally Mr. R.A.-O., I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2193, 18 (2003)
(Hugessen, J., dissenting).
123 Compare Case C-249/96, Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. 1-0621
(unmarried same sex couple not similarly situated to married opposite-sex couple; no violation
of equal treatment to discriminate between them in employment benefits), with Case C-309/89,
Codomou SA v. Council of EU, 1994 E.C.R. 1-1853 (Spanish producers of sparkling wine are
similarly situated to producers in France and Luxembourg; regulation granting exclusive use of
the term "cremant" to producers in France and Luxembourg violated the right to equal
treatment).
124 See CLAYTON & TOMLINSON, supra note 22, at 1209-09; Provincial Picture Houses v.
Wednesbury Corp. (1948) 1 K.B. 223 (Eng.) (when reviewing discretionary acts of government,
court will consider whether account has been taken of the pertinent factors and extraneous
circumstances have been disregarded; court will not evaluate the reasonableness of the outcome
in substance).
125 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819) ("Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional.").
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U.S. rational basis test.'26 While international administrative tribunals have
had occasion to apply both d~tournement de pouvoir and equal treatment
analysis in the same case, an inquiry for bad faith or prejudice has not
traditionally been integral to the tribunal's equal treatment framework.'27
2. Open Comparison
Another basic difference between the similarly situated test of equal
treatment and U.S. employment discrimination law is that in the United States,
a case is effectively over if the plaintiff fails to prove an intent to discriminate
on impermissible grounds. U.S. plaintiffs have no cause of action for simple
unequal treatment having a rational basis.'28 By contrast, because the similarly
situated test is not specifically concerned with prejudice or even employment
relations, a plaintiff who has standing can invoke this test to complain about
any differential treatment, as between the plaintiff and similarly situated
comparators. There is no requirement to show or even allege that the
differential treatment implicates a protected classification, such as race,
nationality, or sex."'
This aspect of the test can lead to absurd outcomes. For example, when
incorrect administration results in one person receiving better treatment than
what is required under the relevant substantive criteria, then a similarly
situated person may claim a right to equal treatment, i.e., an equally incorrect
outcome under the substantive criteria.1 3' The ECJ and its subordinate courts
26 Animosity toward the impacted class of persons cannot constitute a legitimate government
interest under U.S. constitutional jurisprudence. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,631-32 (1996);
U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
127 In its very first case, the World Bank Administrative Tribunal considered claims of
improper motivation and unequal treatment in a challenge to changes in the organization's tax
reimbursement system that had a disproportionate financial impact upon U.S. nationals. The
changes were upheld on the basis that their purpose had been nondiscriminatory, the
organization's choice reasonable, and hence, there had been no abuse of power. De Merode,
W.B. Admin. Trib., Decision No. 1, 47, 85-87 (1981).
128 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) ("[O]ur cases have not embraced the
proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially
discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate
impact.") (emphasis in original).
129 See Press, I.L.O. Admin. Trib., JudgmentNo. 66 (1962) (holding when work ofauthorship
is jointly created by employees, there is no duty to identify the individual authors, but equal
treatment is violated when the organization selectively identifies some but not all joint authors).
130 Brake, supra note 16, at 604 (summarizing Christopher Peters, Equality Revisited, 110
HARv. L. REV. 1210, 1222-24 (1997)).
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partially compensate for this deficiency of the similarly situated test by
overlaying another rule, which provides that no person may rely, in support of
a claim on an unlawful act in favor of another. 1
31
The open comparison of the similarly situated test contrasts with the law
of employment discrimination in the United States, where courts generally
adhere strictly to the categories of protected classes enumerated in the
Constitution and the relevant statutes.'32 Canada's Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, and the jurisprudence thereunder, follow a middle route,
enumerating categories of protected classes but inviting consideration of other
"analogous" protected classes, as discussed later. 133
3. Identity of Circumstances
One might expect, absent the need to prove intent or membership in a
protected class, that plaintiffs in the international civil service would have
great success winning claims of unequal treatment using the similarly situated
test. For most of the history of the international administrative tribunals,
however, the reverse was true. One reason for this was the tribunals'
adherence to the origins of the right to equal treatment as a constraint upon
administrative acts of discretion, and their reluctance to apply the right against
discriminatory legislative acts. Thus, in three notorious cases from the early
1970s-Taylor-Ungaro'34 and Kiewning-Korner Castronovo135 from the
ILOAT, and Mullan136 from the UNAT-systematic gender discrimination in
the administration of employee benefits was affirmed because that
discrimination was sanctioned in the relevant staff rules.'37 Given that the
female plaintiffs in those cases were placed de jure into a different class than
31 E.g., Case T-298/02, Romeu v. Comm'n of the Eur. Cmtys., 2005 E.C.R. 11-4599, 77.
3' E.g., Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973) (holding alienage or citizenship
discrimination does not offend the prohibition against national origin discrimination in Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). But see Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S.
75 (1998) (holding same sex sexual harassment constitutes discrimination "because of... sex"
within the meaning of Title VII). Constitutional rational basis review is, however, open to wide
comparators.
131 See infra note 400 and accompanying text.
114 I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 167 (1970).
' I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 168 (1970).
136 U.N. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 162 (1972).
137 Taylor-Ungaro, I.L.O. No. 1671, 1; Kiewning-Korner Castronovo, I.L.O. No. 168, 1;
Mullan, U.N. No. 162, at VIII.
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their male comparators, they were not deemed similarly situated to the
comparators. 1
38
A second set of reasons for plaintiffs' limited success with discrimination
claims relates to the litigation process within the international organizations.
Although the tribunals are not courts of review, in the sense that they generally
owe no deference to the findings in earlier internal processes of administrative
review, the tribunals rarely look beyond the case records developed in those
earlier processes, and they almost never hold oral hearings. When plaintiffs
are pursuing their complaints pro se in those earlier internal processes, as is
often the case, the cases begin from emotionally charged but inartfully pled
complaints, which are built upon mistaken legal foundations and then hindered
by the plaintiffs' ineffective investigations into the relevant circumstances.
A third factor, and the most significant for this paper, has been the
traditional strictness of the test for similarity of circumstances as between the
plaintiff and the comparators. For years, international administrative tribunals
demanded near-identity of circumstances between the plaintiff and the
comparators. Anything less and the plaintiff was deemed not similarly situated
to the comparators and, ipsofacto, not a victim of unequal treatment.'39
B. The Test Evolves
As shown above, the traditional approach to the similarly situated test was
a formalistic one, requiring near-identity of circumstances between the plaintiff
and the comparators who were being treated differently. This was the same
approach followed by the ECJ applying Community Law. 4 Cases applying
the similarly situated test in this way have yielded confusing results,
13 Taylor-Ungaro, I.L.O. No. 167, 1; Kiewning-Korner Castronovo, I.L.O. No. 168, 1;
Mullan, U.N. No. 162, at VIII.
139 For an example of all three factors at play, see Dadivas, I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment
No. 60 (1962). Although the claim of unequal pay was never very compelling in that case, the
claim was hampered by the plaintiff's initial emphasis on challenging the pay rules, her inartful
framing of the issues, and her failure to identify comparators that, in the Tribunal's words,
"performed exactly the same duties as she did." Id. at II(2)(a) (emphasis added).
140 E.g., Case 817/79, Buyl v. Comm'n ofthe European Cmtys., 1982 E.C.R. 245, 29 (when
European Council amended its staffregulations to provide a different exchange rate for payment
of salaries in other than Belgian francs than the rate used for payment ofpensions, the court ruled
there was no discrimination because "discrimination in the legal sense consists of treating in an
identical manner situations which are different or treating in a different manner situations which
are identical. The situation of a serving official differs considerably from that of a
pensioner...").
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particularly where the issue was one of true discrimination, that is, unequal
treatment motivated by or reflecting prejudice. This part separately reviews
the cases involving simple inequality and those involving true discrimination,
to illuminate the inadequacies of the test in the latter set of cases.
Because the similarly situated test is unconcerned with prejudicial motive,
it does not acknowledge this distinction between simple inequality and true
discrimination. Judge Hugessen suggested that this is the fundamental flaw in
the similarly situated test and that a more robust analytical framework is
required in cases of true discrimination. 4' But the tribunals have responded
to the inadequacies of the similarly situated test by discretely expanding upon
the traditional test in both categories of cases, often to the detriment of
jurisprudential coherence.
Interestingly, the tribunals have tended to be circumspect in their opinions
in true discrimination cases, even where departures from the traditional
similarly situated test were clearly at play. Because the tribunals have been
more forthcoming with their reasoning in cases of simple inequality, those
cases are reviewed first.
1. The Similarly Situated Test in Cases of Simple Unequal Treatment
The case of De Los Cobos, from 1980, is a frequently cited example where
unequal treatment was alleged but, there was no plausible contention that
prejudice was involved.'42 The ILO faced a critical financial crisis brought on
by the withdrawal of the United States from membership from 1977 to 1980.43
To address the crisis, the Director-General temporarily shortened the work
week and reduced salaries for employees.'" This action was challenged by
more than 100 employees alleging, among other things, a breach of equality
because the cuts did not apply to certain categories of employees.1
45
In a modest departure from the similarly situated test that had been used to
unfortunate result in Taylor- Ungaro, the ILOAT continued its inquiry beyond
the fact that the plaintiffs were classified de jure in a different employment
category than their colleagues who received different treatment. The tribunal
141 Mr. R.A.-O., I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2193, 18 (2003) (Hugessen, J.,
dissenting).
142 I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 391 (1980).
143 William P. Alford, The Prospective Withdrawal of the United States from the
International Labor Organization: Rationales & Implications, 17 HARV. INT'LL.J. 623 (1976).
44 DeLos Cobos, I.L.O. No. 391, atA.
145 Id. at C.
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examined whether the plaintiffs' circumstances were substantively and
relevantly different from those of the exempted employees. 146 For example,
one category of employees exempted from the cuts was the so-called "experts,"
specialists in a field who usually contract with an IGO to work on a specific
project or to provide expertise for a fixed period. The tribunal observed that,
unlike the plaintiffs whose salaries were borne by the administrative budget
that was under strain, "most experts are usually paid out of funds obtained
from outside the ILO."' 147 Thus, the experts' circumstance was different, in a
way that was relevant to the differential treatment, from the staff affected by
the cuts. 4 No reasonable rule of law could require the organization to cut
salaries of experts who are paid outside the budget, as a condition to
legitimately cut salaries for those who are paid within the budget.
149
Moreover, the tribunal's observation that "most"--but not all-such experts
are "usually"--but not always-paid from outside sources, seems to
acknowledge that the relevant difference in circumstance between the plaintiffs
and their colleagues who received different treatment need not be true in every
single case. 5' It was sufficient that the relevant difference in circumstance
exists in the large.
Another example from the ILOAT of how the similarly situated test
inquires for a relevant difference in circumstances is the case of Tarrab (No. 7)
from 1982. "' A staff member in the professional category of staff challenged
an increase in certain allowances paid to support-level "general service"
staff.'52 The tribunal ruled the difference in allowances was justified, not
simply because of the dejure distinctions between the professional and general
service staff, but also because there were relevant differences in recruitment
patterns between the two categories of staff.'
Whereas the ILOAT's inquiry for a relevant difference in circumstances
was rather superficial in those two cases, the ECJ seemed to take a more
probing inquiry, as illustrated in the 1983 case of Ferrario. ' That case
146 Id. T 9.
147 Id.
148 Id.
14 Id. It might be argued by Westen, supra note 4, that this case does not implicate equality
at all; rather, the ILOAT cast in equality terms a simple review for arbitrariness.
15o De Los Cobos, I.L.O. No. 391, 9.
's' I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 498 (1982).
152 Id. at A.
153 Id. 1.
'14 Case No. 152/81, Ferrario v. Comm'n of the European Cmtys., 1983 E.C.R. 2357.
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involved claims by Italian nationals working in Italy for certain allowances to
pay for higher education for their children.' The organization paid those
allowances only to expatriate employees whose children attended higher
education at least fifty kilometers from the place of employment in
northwestern Italy.'56
The ECJ started by accepting that the organization may legitimately
compensate expatriates for the disadvantages of working away from their
country of origin, including the cost of sending children back to their country
of origin for higher education.'57 In response, the plaintiffs pointed out that the
policy allowed expatriates to receive the allowance in respect of children
studying in a third country, or even in Italy where the parent is employed.'
The ECJ retorted that such a situation also entails disadvantages for expatriates
in comparison to local nationals, and anyway, the statistics showed that the
number of expatriate staff whose children attended higher education in the
place of employment was small, so the organization "cannot be criticized for
having left that option open for such employees."' 59 This latter point follows
from De Los Cobos, that it is not necessary for the organization's differential
treatment to match a difference in circumstance in every case, as long as the
circumstances differ in the large.
For sixteen years after the De Los Cobos judgment in 1980, the similarly
situated test governed with the somewhat deeper inquiry into the relevant
difference between the plaintiffs' circumstances and those of colleagues who
were treated differently. The tribunals did not seriously question the
organizations' asserted purposes for the differential treatment.
But in the case ofD 'Aoust,6" from 1996, the IMFAT suggested a subtle but
significant innovation to the similarly situated test. At issue was the IMF's
practice, when determining the initial job grade and salary of a new employee,
to truncate the weight attached to prior work experience at ten years for non-
economists positions, whereas new economist hires were given full credit for
prior experience, and presumably, higher initial salary grades and salaries.'
61
15 Id. 5.
156 Id. 2.
'" See discussion of the principle of geographic distribution, infra note 256 and
accompanying text.
.. Ferrario, 1983 E.C.R. 2357, 12.
159 Id.
160 I.M.F. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 1996-1.
161 Id. 7(b).
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The IMFAT observed that, because economics is at the heart of the IMF's
mission, the organization could favor economists in deciding upon the terms
of staff employment, but "not unreasonably."'' 6 2 The meaning of this wordplay
is mysterious. At a minimum, as in the earlier cases, the IMFAT here required
that the difference in treatment have a relationship to real differences between
the categories of affected staff that are relevant to legitimate organizational
interests. Thus, the IMF can favor economists in the terms of employment,
because there are real differences between economists and others, and because
economics is at the heart of its mission.
But the IMFAT may have introduced a further constraint upon the
organization's discretion to favor economists-that it act "not
unreasonably"-which would suggest that the degree of differential treatment
should bear a relationship to the degree of difference in circumstances between
the plaintiff and his comparators.163 For the ILOAT in De Los Cobos, it was
enough to have found a relationship between the organization's interests and
the differential treatment; there was no further inquiry into the degree of
differential treatment. For the IMFAT in D 'Aoust, however, it may be that the
differential treatment is valid only if it is judged not unreasonable in relation
to the difference in circumstances.
Significantly, in D 'A oust the IMFAT did not engage in a vigorous analysis
of the degree of differential treatment, as related to the difference in
circumstances between the plaintiff and economists at the IMF. In D 'Aoust,
it may have been that the special place of economists in the IMF was obvious
and beyond question, or it may have been that the tribunal was attentive to the
limits of its own competence to delve into the nuances of human resources
management.
The additional element of reasonableness, or rationality, in the similarly
situated test for equal treatment was amplified by the WBAT in the case of
Mould from 1999.64 In that case, a retired staff member who was legally
separated from his wife sought a ruling that, after a divorce, she would remain
eligible for the subsidized pension that is payable to a surviving spouse.'65 He
claimed that the denial of the surviving spouse pension would discriminate
against divorced couples. 6 6 The tribunal wrote that "differential treatment is
162 Id. 29.
163 Id.
'64 W.B.'Admin. Trib., Decision No. 210, 26 (1999).
165 Id. 3.
166 Id. 10.
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not necessarily discriminatory if there is a rational nexus between the
classification of persons subject to the differential treatment and the objective
of the classification."' 67 The tribunal ruled the organization's objective of
providing for the needs of persons "who remain married to and dependent on"
the retired staff member is reasonably related to the differential treatment of
divorced couples.1
68
In the case of Mr. "R ,169 from 2002, the IMFAT picked up the Mould
"rational nexus" phrasing and placed it within a broader burden-shifting
framework.17 The case involved a plaintiff who previously held the position
of resident representative in a member state, a position "akin to that of an
ambassador," which carries certain exceptional benefits and allowances.'71
Upon completing his rotation, he accepted a different position with the IMF as
head of a training center in a nearby member state. 7 2 The latter position did
not carry those exceptional benefits and allowances.'73 He claimed
discrimination vis-A-vis the organization's resident representative in that latter
member state. 7
4
Under the burden-shifting framework announced in Mr. "R ", the plaintiff
bears an initial burden of showing that the organization distinguishes among
categories of staff including the plaintiff.'75 With this prima facie showing of
unequal treatment, the burden shifts to the organization, first, to produce
evidence supporting the asserted legitimate purposes for the differential
treatment, 176 and second, to persuade the tribunal that the "allocation of
differing benefits to different categories of staff was... reasonably related to
the purposes of those benefits."'
177
The IMFAT's use of the term "allocation of benefits" rather than, say,
"difference in benefits" foreshadowed a more probing analysis than was seen
in previous cases under the similarly situated test. In D'Aoust, the tribunal
167 Id. 26.
168 Id.
169 I.M.F. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2002-1.
'70 Id. T 38. The IMFAT's burden-shifting framework for cases of unequal treatment is to be
distinguished from the ILOAT's burden-shifting framework for ddtournement de pouvoir in
mixed-motive cases, discussed supra note 118 and accompanying text.
' Mr. "R", I.M.F. No. 2002-1 9.
172 Id. 6.
173 Id. 9.
174 Id. 19.
17 Id. 47.
176 Id.
177 Id. 124.
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observed that the differential treatment should be "not unreasonable," but the
tribunal addressed the issue summarily.'78 In Mr. "R ", while ruling in the
organization's favor, the tribunal assessed how the policy of differential
benefits was decided, and what alternatives were considered.'79 The tribunal
noted that the decision to differentiate in benefits was taken by the second
most senior official in the organization's management, overruling the
recommendation of the Human Resources Department, after extended
consideration of more than one option. 80 Hence, it appears that the
reasonableness of the degree of differentiation depends in part upon the
thoroughness of the process leading to the decision on the differential
treatment.
The IMFAT's construct may be compared to two other burden-shifting
frameworks for employment discrimination used by the Supreme Courts of the
United States and Canada. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 81 the U.S.
Supreme Court adopted a three-step framework for allocating burdens of proof
in cases arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. First, the
plaintiff bears a modest burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination,
giving rise to a presumption of unlawful discrimination. 8 2 Second, the
employer must rebut that presumption by producing a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its action.'83 Third, the plaintiff bears the burden
to prove that discrimination was a motivating factor for the action, and thus,
that the asserted legitimate reason is a pretext.
84
Under the Canadian framework adopted in the B. C. Firefighters case, 85
once an employee has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the
burden shifts to the employer to prove that its differential treatment was
adopted in the honest and good faith belief that it was reasonably necessary to
the fulfillment of a legitimate work-related purpose that is rationally connected
to job performance, and that such differential treatment is in fact reasonably
78 D'Aoust, I.M.F. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 1996-1, 29.
179 Mr. "R", I.M.F. Admin. Trib., Judgment 2002-1, 62-64.
180 Id. 64.
181 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
182 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. To prove a prima facie case, the plaintiff must
show that he belongs to a protected class, was rejected from a job or employment benefit for
which he was qualified and applied, and after the rejection the employer continued seeking
applicants or providing the benefit to others. Id.
183 Id.
'8 Id. at 804.
185 B.C. Pub. Serv. Employee Relations Comm'n v. B.C. Gov't & Serv. Employees' Union,
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 3, 176 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (Can.).
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necessary to the accomplishment of that purpose.1 16 Thus, the employer bears
the ultimate burden under the Canadian framework.
In line with both the U.S. and Canadian approaches, the IMFAT test in Mr.
"R" places a modest burden on the plaintiff to establish a presumption of
unequal treatment simply by showing that the organization treats similarly
situated employees differently. 8 7 The IMFAT's approach then follows the
Canadian example of placing the ultimate burden upon the organization to
disprove the presumption of unequal treatment.1
88
It is striking that the IMFAT used this elaborate analysis in Mr. "R", a
fairly straightforward case about different benefits for differently situatedjobs.
Quite unlike the U.S. and Canadian cases that use a burden-shifting
framework, Mr. "R" alleged no invidious discrimination and there was no
affront to human rights or dignity; it was a case of simple administrative
inequality.189 Even in cases involving true discrimination, the use of a burden-
shifting analysis in employment discrimination cases is not uncontroversial.190
The U.K. House of Lords has endorsed the following view:
It is unnecessary and unhelpful to introduce the concept of a
shifting evidential burden of proof. At the conclusion of all the
evidence the tribunal should make findings as to the primary facts
and draw such inferences as they consider proper from those
facts. They should then reach a conclusion on the balance of
probabilities, bearing in mind the difficulties which face a person
who complains of unlawful discrimination and the fact that it is
for the complainant to prove his or her case.' 9'
186 B.C., 176 D.L.R. (4th) at 24-25.
87 Mr. "R", I.M.F. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2002-1, 47.
"'8 Id. For a broader comparison between U.S. and foreign tests for employment
discrimination, see, e.g., Rosemary Hunter & Elain W. Shoben, Disparate Impact
Discrimination: American Oddity or Internationally Accepted Concept?, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. REv. 108 (1998).
189 Once again, it might be said by Westen, supra note 4, that Mr. "R" was not an equality
case at all, and that the IMFAT's use of an equality analysis only cloaks its review for
arbitrariness.
190 See Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting Approach in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 703 (1995).
'9' Zafar v. Glasgow City Council, [1997] 1 W.L.R. 1659, 1665, [1998] I.R.L.R. 36 (H.L.)
(quoting Neill, L.J., in King v. Great Britain China Centre, [ 1992] I.C.R. 516,528-29 (C.A. Civ.
Div.)).
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The burden-shifting constructs are faulted not only for intruding into the
judicial authority of the court, but also for stepping on the intentions of
legislatures and, injury cases, befuddling jurors with legalisms. 19 2 However,
the IMFAT's burden-shifting framework in Mr. "R" has been received quite
positively. 93 The IMFAT and other international administrative tribunals do
not have juries to befuddle. Also, the organizations' antidiscrimination
regulations have been relatively spare, especially as regards procedural and
evidentiary matters, so there is less risk of the framework stepping on
legislative intentions. Conversely, the framework brings greater clarity to the
elements of the judicial analysis, which can be useful to both IGOs and
potential plaintiffs in evaluating their positions in circumstances of possible
unequal treatment or discrimination.
2. Applying the Similarly Situated Test in Cases of True Discrimination
As noted previously, claims of prejudice in individual decisions are
analyzed by the tribunals under the doctrine of dtournement de pouvoir.194
But that doctrine is ill-suited to cases of systemic discrimination, such as bias
or stereotyping in the rules on allocation ofjobs and benefits; in such cases, it
rarely will be possible to attribute abuse or bad faith to any decisionmaker.
Accordingly, the tribunals have addressed such cases under the similarly
situated test, in the same way as claims for simple administrative
evenhandedness.
Most of the cases involving systemic discrimination have fallen into one of
three categories: discrimination against women, discrimination based on
expatriate status, and discrimination in favor of married employees. Each of
these categories will be considered in turn.
a. Cases of Discrimination Against Women
Gender discrimination has been the most common allegation in the
tribunals' jurisprudence of discrimination involving prejudice. Starting in
1970, several cases were brought to the ILOAT, the UNAT, and other tribunals
by female employees complaining about explicit sex discrimination in the
192 Davis, supra note 190, at 707.
'9' See Mr. C, E.B.R.D. Admin. Trib., Decision No. 01/03 (2003), supra note 111 and
accompanying text.
194 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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administration of benefits by international organizations. The first three of
these cases were decided against the plaintiffs on grounds that the differential
treatment was required by the organizations' internal legislation, and thus, on
a de jure basis, the female employees were not similarly situated to their male
counterparts.195 Subsequently, the tribunals' reversed themselves, but without
clearly explaining the reasons for doing so, or disavowing the earlier
judgments.
In the cases of Taylor-Ungaro, 6 from 1970, andMullan,197 from 1972, the
ILOAT and UNAT, respectively, upheld decisions to withhold from female
staff members certain travel benefits in respect of their husbands, because the
husbands were not financial dependents of the staff members. Those decisions
had been taken consistently with staff rules promulgated by the
administrations, which provided for payment of such benefits for the wives of
male staff regardless of the wives' dependent status, but required female staff
to show that their husbands were dependent in order to receive the benefit.' 98
In turn, the staff rules' distinctions based on gender were viewed by the
tribunals as following from the primary legislation (staff regulations) adopted
by the highest legislative organs (the General Assemblies) of the respective
organizations.'"9
The tribunals determined that, because the female plaintiffs were, de jure,
in a different category than their male colleagues, there was no identity in the
circumstances, and the two categories were not similarly situated."' Thus, the
differential treatment was appropriate. In Taylor-Ungaro, the key passage
reads as follows:
As to invalidity, four grounds are alleged by the complainant,
namely, sex discrimination, category discrimination, lack of
agreement with the Staff Council and lack of consultation
with the Staff Council. As to the first three, the Tribunal
considers that, even if the allegation was well founded in fact,
it would not affect the validity of Rule 302.3023 inasmuch as
the Director-General by making the Rule would not be
'g See supra Part IVA.3.
196 See Taylor-Ungaro, I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 167 (1970).
19' See Mullan, U.N. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 162 (1972).
198 Mullan, U.N. No. 162, at VIII; Taylor-Ungaro, I.L.O. No. 167, B-C.
'" Mullan, U.N. No. 162, at IX; Taylor-Ungaro, I.L.O. No. 167, T 2.
200 Mullan, U.N. No. 162, at IX; Taylor-Ungaro, I.L.O. No. 167, 2.
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exceeding the powers conferred upon him under Rule XXXVI of
the General Rules of the Organization.20 '
The ILOAT acknowledged that the claim of sex discrimination may be
"well founded in fact," i.e., that it may infringe a right to be treated as an
equal, if there is such a right.20 2 Yet the ILOAT summarily and formalistically
condoned unequal treatment that would later be acknowledged as plainly
unlawful gender discrimination.
At issue in the third of the early cases, Kiewning-Korner Castronovo, was
a non-resident allowance payable to expatriate staff by the FAO, which is
based in Rome.20 3 The ILOAT upheld administrative rules promulgated by the
Director-General whereby the allowance was terminated as to female
expatriate staffwho married local nationals.2° Under Italian law, an expatriate
woman who married an Italian man thereby obtained Italian citizenship
automatically and without exception, whereas an expatriate man who married
an Italian woman did not.2 5 Therefore, a similarly situated male employee
would continue to receive the allowance.
The complainant alleged sex discrimination and violation of Article 15(2)
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that no one
should be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality.206 The ILOAT dismissed on
all counts because the unequal treatment was sanctioned by an administrative
memorandum and then a staff rule that were not inconsistent with the authority
granted to the Director-General by the General Assembly.
27
These early judgments failed to examine whether the plaintiffs were
differently situated from their male colleagues in a way that was relevant to the
legitimate purposes of the staff rules. They also did not consider whether there
was a rational nexus between the allocation of benefits and the purported
differences between male and female staff members. Finally, these three
judgments certainly did not question the organizations' supposed legitimate
purpose in legislating this unequal treatment, or whether the gender biases that
underlay those staff rules nullified the supposed legitimacy of the erstwhile
purposes.
201 Taylor-Ungaro, I.L.O. No. 167, 2.
202 id.
203 See Kiewning-Komer Castronovo, I.L.O. Admin. Trib., JudgmentNo. 168, at B-C (1970).
204 Id.
205 Id. 2.
206 Id. at C.
207 Id. 1-2.
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The outcomes in these cases reflected an aversion to judicial review of
legislative acts even though by the early 1970s the French Conseil d'Etat, the
European Court of Justice and some other courts already had established
spheres for judicial review.2"' Additionally, the tribunals' circular analysis
saved them from reaching the difficult substantive questions: Did those rules,
and the administration of the rules, reflect and reinforce prejudice against
women; if so, was that prejudice justified; if not, is there a right to be treated
as an equal that permits or requires the tribunals to do something about the
injustice?
Shortly after the UNAT decision in Mullan, the ECJ ruled the opposite way
on similar facts in the case of Sabbatini.2"9 The court passed over the
organization's contention that the difference in treatment was pursuant to a
regulation duly adopted by the European Council, finding an infringement of
a provision in the Treaty Establishing the European Community relating to the
principle of equal pay for male and female workers.2"' There are two notable
components to this decision. First, unlike the ILO or UNAT, the ECJ is
expressly empowered to review the legislative acts of the European Council,
and the ECJ had recently confirmed the breadth of that power in another
context. 211 Accordingly, this aspect of the decision in Sabbatini represented
a modest extension of that power to include the review of employment
regulations. The ECJ was less constrained by the aversion to judicial review.
Second, the European court recognized that the similarly situated test
requires at least a superficial inquiry beyond the de jure classification. The
ECJ pointed out that the purpose of the expatriation allowance at issue was to
compensate for the special expenses and disadvantages of working away from
their habitual place of residence, and that withdrawal of the benefit upon
marriage to a local resident could be justified. 12 However, withdrawing the
benefit based on different criteria for men than for women, requiring the latter
to prove the financial dependency of their husbands, violated the requirement
of equal treatment irrespective of sex.213
208 See George A. Bermann, The Scope ofJudicial Review in French Administrative Law, 16
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 195 (1977).
2o9 Case 20/71, Sabbatini v. European Parl., 1972 E.C.R. 345.
210 Id. 14.
211 Comm'n of the European Cmtys. v. Council of the European Cmtys, Case 22/70, 1971
E.C.R. 263 (Council's resolution on member state negotiations for rail transport agreement was
a justiciable act). See Case 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585.
212 Sabbatini, 1972 E.C.R. 345, 8.
213 Id. 12.
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Nevertheless, the tribunal's inquiry remained superficial and formalistic.
The European court did not consider whether the plaintiffs were differently
situated from their male colleagues in a way that was relevant to the legitimate
purposes of the staff rules. It also did not consider whether there was a
rational nexus between the allocation of benefits and the purported differences
between male and female staff members.
In Sabbatini, the Advocate-General2t 4 attempted a more substantive
analysis. He wrote that, in spite of advances made in achieving equality
between men and women, the laws of member states continued to hold the
husband presumptively responsible for providing for the family and to vest in
the husband rights to manage a joint estate and to choose the place of
residence.2"5 He concluded, therefore, that it was not irrational for the
organization to assume that a male, married staff member would be the
financial head of household while requiring a female, married staff member to
demonstrate that status.216 While one might disagree with the Advocate-
General's conclusions, nevertheless it is admirable that he advanced a deeper
analytical framework that inquired whether there were differences in fact
between male and female staff members relevant to any legitimate purposes for
the differential treatment. That analysis was a precursor to the reasonable
nexus requirement that would later be applied by the WBAT in the Mould case
and by the IMFAT in the case of Mr. "R ". 21 7 However, the Advocate-
General's analysis was not so deep as to ask whether the differential rules
offended the equal dignity of women.
In rebuffing the Advocate-General's opinion, the ECJ in Sabbatini did not
explain why a male staff member's greater responsibility under the applicable
national law to financially provide for the family did not justify his more
favorable treatment under the organization's rules. There are at least two
possible explanations. One is that the European court discounted the relevance
to the question of the employer's compensation and benefits policies of those
national laws governing family relations cited by the Advocate-General.
Indeed, that national laws may assign greater financial responsibility to the
man upon divorce, and give the man a privilege to determine the place of
2"4 An Advocate-General is the European court's independent examiner, whose opinion on
the case is normally accorded great weight. See Cyril Ritter, A New Look at the Role andImpact
ofAdvocates General- Collectively and Individually, 12 COLUM.J. EUR. L. 751,756-57(2007).
215 Opinion of the Advocate-General in Sabbatini, 1972 C.M.L.R. 945, 950.
216 Id. at 950, 953-54.
217 See supra notes 169, 170 and accompanying text.
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residence, would seem to be of no import to employees who are not divorcing
or relocating, or to the organization's allocation of benefits to those employees.
A second possible explanation for the outcome in Sabbatini is that the court
considered sex discrimination to be so invidious as to defy the Advocate-
General's attempt to rationalize a justification for the differential treatment.
However, this explanation is belied by the outcome of two cases decided
shortly after Sabbatini, on facts similar to the ILOAT case of Kiewning-Korner
Castronovo. In Airola,218 the plaintiff was an expatriate working in Italy who
acquired Italian citizenship automatically upon her marriage to a local
national." 9 In Van den Broeck,220 the plaintiff was an expatriate working in
Belgium who acquired Belgian citizenship upon her marriage to a local
national.22" ' Whereas Italian law provided no possibility for the woman to
renounce her newly acquired Italian citizenship, Belgian law did provide that
option.222
Pursuant to the organization's rules, both female plaintiffs lost their
expatriate benefits when they acquired local nationality upon their marriages,
even though similarly situated male colleagues would not have lost those
benefits (because they would not have obtained local citizenship). Consistent
with Sabbatini, the ECJ announced in both judgments that "the expatriation
allowance must be determined by considerations which are uniform and
disregard the difference in sex." '223
In Van den Broeck, the court ruled that this requirement had been met
because the plaintiff had the option to renounce the Belgian citizenship
acquired by marriage, but did not exercise that option.224 The ECJ wrote, "[a]s
the applicant chose not to avail herself of this right, there are no reasons
associated with equal treatment why her [B]elgian nationality should not be
taken into account in applying the provision concerned," that is, the staff
regulation that deprived her of the expatriate benefits.225 In other words,
although the Belgian law plainly differentiated between the treatment of men
and women upon marriage to local nationals, for purposes that the court did
not attempt to justify, and although the organization's benefits policies were
211 Case 21/74, Airola v. Comm'n of the European Cmtys., 1975 E.C.R. 221.
219 Id. 3.
220 Case 37/74, Van den Broeck v. Comm'n of the European Cmtys., 1975 E.C.R. 235.
221 Id. 13-14.
222 Id. 4.
223 Van den Broeck, 1975 E.C.R. 235, 9; Airola, 1975 E.C.R. 221, 9.
224 Van den Broeck, 1975 E.C.R. 235, 14.
225 Id.
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linked to that differential treatment, also for purposes that are controvertible,
at best, the ECJ found no violation of the right to equal treatment because the
final step in the differential treatment was an act of the plaintiff's own
volition.226
If the ECJ considered sex discrimination invidious and intolerable, the
court easily could have reached a different outcome, for example, by
questioning whether the organization's link between its benefits policies and
the discriminatory Belgian law was reasonably related or necessary to the
legitimate purpose of those benefits. In a subsequent case, the European
Commission argued that the employee's personal situation, in the sense of his
integration into the duty station country, is the paramount consideration in
eligibility for these expatriate benefits, and nationality is only a secondary
factor.227 That being the case, it seems unreasonable for the organization to
totally deny such benefits to female staff upon their marriages to local
nationals, while continuing those benefits to similarly situated male colleagues,
simply because of the discriminatory effects ofnational law and without regard
to who actually is more integrated into the duty station country.
In Airola, the court ruled there was a violation of equal treatment because
the plaintiff had been deprived of the expatriate benefits when she had no
option to renounce the automatic acquisition of Italian citizenship upon her
marriage."' The organization was required to interpret the concept of
"nationals" in its staff regulations "in such a way as to avoid any unwarranted
difference of treatment as between male and female officials who are, in fact,
placed in comparable situations. '2 9 The fact that, although not volitionally,
the plaintiff in Airola had obtained the advantages of becoming a citizen of the
duty station country apparently was not deemed sufficient to warrant the
organization's difference in treatment between her and her male colleagues
who also married local nationals. 23 ' Thus, rather than requiring the
organization to abandon the link between its internal rules and discriminatory
226 See also Case 257/78, Devred v. Comm'n of European Cmtys., 1979 E.C.R. 3767, 12
("[W]here the person concerned was able to renounce the nationality which causes her to lose
the benefit of the expatriation allowance, there is no reason associated with the purposes for
which that allowance was granted for disregarding the fact that, by an act of her own volition
subsequent to, but distinct from, her marriage, the official decided to assume the nationality of
the place in which she is employed.").
227 Case T-4/92, Vardakas v. Comm'n of European Cmtys., 1993 E.C.R. 11-0357, 30.
228 Airola, 1975 E.C.R. 221, 77 11, 13, 16.
229 Id. 10.
230 Id. 9.
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national laws, the ILOAT modified the organization's rules to compensate for
the discrimination at the national level. This gave the plaintiff in Airola the
best of both worlds, and remedied one inequality by creating another inequality
vis-A-vis her male colleagues.
Following the ECJ's groundbreaking decision in Sabbatini, other
international administrative tribunals began using general principles of
equality to overturn staff regulations involving sex discrimination. In cases
from 1973 and 1975, on facts similar to those in Taylor- Ungaro and Kiewning-
Korner Castronovo, the Council of Europe Appeals Board ruled it was
unlawful sex discrimination to provide allowances for male staff with
dependent children but not to female staff with dependent children even if they
earned more than their husbands, and it was unlawful to terminate non-resident
allowances paid to expatriate female staff upon marriage to local French
nationals, even though by operation of French law, the women automatically
acquired French citizenship.23'
By 1975, the ILOAT had come around to a more probing application of the
similarly situated test, at least as regards gender discrimination. In the case of
Raboz&e,2 32 the tribunal struck down the organization's sex discrimination in
medical insurance coverage. The female plaintiff sought coverage under the
organization's medical insurance for her husband, who held less generous
coverage through his employment.2 34 Although the applicable rule referred to
coverage of the "spouse" and not "dependent spouse," the organization
defended the denial of coverage on the basis that the spirit of the rule was to
cover dependents only, and the plaintiff's husband was not her dependent.
2 35
The apparent practice of the organization was to grant spousal coverage to all
male staffwho requested it, while denying such coverage to female staff unless
their husbands were shown to be dependents. The ILOAT overturned the
denial of coverage due to the patent sex discrimination in the administration
of the gender-neutral rule.236
The greater significance of this judgment is that, even while the tribunal
accepted that the intent of the organization's medical insurance program was
to cover dependents only, the ILOAT disputed that a showing of actual
231 Artzet, Council of Eur. Apps. Bd., App. No. 8 (1973); Leguin, Council of Europe Apps.
Bd., App. No. 32 (1975).
232 I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 264 (1975).
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id.
[Vol. 36:1
2007] INEQUALITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE 41
financial dependency was required for spousal coverage. For perhaps the first
time in an equal treatment case, and one of the only times in a case involving
sex discrimination, the ILOAT openly engaged in a substantive analysis to
show that the reality of the plaintiffs circumstance was effectively the same
as that of her male comparators who were treated differently. The ILOAT
wrote that any spouse should be regarded as dependent, because that is "the
actual situation of the spouses, who owe each other a duty of mutual assistance
and who, when both are in gainful employment, may be regarded as mutually
dependent." '237 This kind of "reality check" by the ILOAT would also be seen
in De Los Cobos, discussed earlier.23 8 As shown below, such an analysis sets
an important precedent for later challenges to the privileges accorded to
married staff members in the benefits paid by IGOs.
The ILOAT achieved the same result in the case of Callewaert-
Haezebrouck (No. 2),239 also involving sex-based distinctions in the provision
of subsidized medical insurance. In contrast to Rabozee, where the
organization's rules were facially gender-neutral and the discrimination was
in the implementation, in Callewaert-Haezebrouck the female staff were de
jure in a different class from the male staff pursuant to a rule duly enacted by
the organization's high legislative organ."' Thus, in holding that the rule
unlawfully discriminated, the ILOAT effectively overturned its earlier
judgment in Taylor-Ungaro,24 ' which held that dejure differentiation based on
sex could not be challenged under the principle of equality because there was
no identity of circumstances.24 2
However, the tribunal overturned Taylor-Ungaro covertly, with absolutely
no mention of either that case or the Raboze judgment, and in summary
fashion, giving no explanation for this significant about-face in an important
sex discrimination case. This reticence contrasts with the tribunal's relatively
lengthy opinion two years later in De los Cobos-not a sex discrimination
case-where the ILOAT explained that de jure differential treatment requires
differential circumstances that are substantial and relevant.24 3 It may be
inferred, from the analytical framework laid out in De Los Cobos and from the
tribunal's views in Raboz~e about the mutual dependency of married persons,
237 Id.
238 See supra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
239 I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 344 (1978).
240 Id. at B.
141 I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 167, 2 (1970).
242 Id.
243 I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 391, 9 (1980).
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that in Callewaert-Haezebrouck the ILOAT concluded there was no substantial
difference between female and male married staff members that was relevant
to the employer's regulation of subsidized health insurance coverage.
The ultimate test of the legitimacy and vibrancy of an equality
jurisprudence is its influence over practices and attitudes. By this standard, the
similarly situated test for equal treatment as applied by tribunals in the 1970s
may be considered a disappointment; it did not succeed in wiping away overt
discrimination against women in the international civil service. Thus, eleven
years after Callewaert-Haezebrouck, and fourteen years after the ECJ struck
down a similar rule in Airola, UNESCO continued to discriminate against
female staff by discontinuing certain expatriate benefits upon their marriage
to local nationals, while such benefits continued for men who married local
nationals. UNESCO's rule was finally overturned by the ILOAT in 1989, in
the case of Meyer.2"
Again, however, the tribunal's reasoning was covert in Meyer, and there
was no reference to the Rabozge precedent. Rather, the ILOAT abandoned any
pretense that it was using the similarly situated test, and simply asserted that
the rule "was not enforceable because it was discriminatory: it offended
against UNESCO's constitutional objectives, the Charter of the United
Nations, the general principles of law and the law of the international civil
service, all of which condemn discrimination on the grounds of sex."24
Recalling that, in Sabbatini it was not clear whether the ECJ disagreed with the
predicates of the Advocate-General's justification for the discrimination
against women, or considered that sex discrimination is so invidious as to defy
any rationalization, it may be inferred from the strong language in Meyer that
the ILOAT had reached the second conclusion. The discrimination evidently
was so invidious to the ILOAT as to defy any need for the tribunal to explain
its overriding of legislative prerogatives.
The gender cases applying the similarly situated test manifest uncertainty
or even disagreement within and among the tribunals about the objective of the
general principle of equality. In this, the international administrative tribunals
were in good company. In Frontiero v. Richardson246 from 1972, the U.S.
Supreme Court was likewise conflicted over facts similar to those in Taylor-
Ungaro and Mullan.
244 I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 978 (1989).
245 Id. 13.
246 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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In Frontiero, a U.S. Air Force regulation allowed payment of housing and
medical benefits automatically for the wives of servicemen, while requiring
servicewomen to prove that their husbands were dependent.247 Future Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, arguing on behalf of the plaintiffs, contended that "the
exclusion of women from benefits to which similarly situated men are
automatically entitled lacks the constitutionally required fair and substantial
relation to a permissible legislative purpose and therefore must be held to
violate the equal protection clause., 241 She contended further that a stricter
judicial test than the rational basis standard should be applied to discrimination
against women.249
The Supreme Court struck down the Air Force regulation, with eight
justices agreeing there was no rational relationship between the discrimination
against servicewomen and any legitimate government purpose.25" Four of
those justices also agreed with Ginsburg that a stricter judicial test should be
applied to sex discrimination, given the history of invidious treatment of
women in society and the immutability of sex as a personal characteristic. 251
Such reference to a history of discrimination and the immutability of personal
characteristics, as justifications for creating new categories of persons to
whom heightened judicial scrutiny applies, would later be seen in cases from
Canada and Europe.
In the gender cases beginning with Taylor-Ungaro in 1970 through Meyer
in 1989, wittingly or not the tribunals participated in a social drama that also
was playing out in the courts and the streets of member states in North
America, Europe and elsewhere. Viewed with the perspective of thirty years,
it is unmistakable that the impugned rules had the effect of perpetuating
stereotypes of women, and that those stereotypes had their origins in animosity
against women in the workplace. It also is clear that the IGOs were not always
proactive about eliminating those differential rules, even when the prejudicial
effects were identified.
The most interesting jurisprudential question is why the tribunals accepted
such prejudice in the earlier cases but stepped in against it in the later ones.
In that regard, it is unfortunate that, in moving from Taylor-Ungaro to
2417 Id. at 678.
248 Brief for A.C.L.U. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 60, Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (No. 71-1684), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/ava
Ion/curiaeihtml/411-677/005.htm (last visited July 6, 2007).
249 Id. at 8-9.
250 See Frontiero, 411 U.S. 691-92 (Powell, J., concurring).
251 Id. at 685-87.
2007]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Callewaert-Haezebrouck to Meyer, the ILOAT in particular passed over these
opportunities to articulate a substantive rationale why such gender
discrimination was eventually found to infringe the principle of equality. The
principle originally was used by the French Conseil d'Etat to enforce
evenhandedness in discretionary administrative acts, and that narrow
approach-the right to equal treatment-seems to explain the outcomes in
Taylor-Ungaro and Mullan. But the Conseil d'Etat had long applied the
principle in its broader, morally infused sense-the right to treatment as an
equal-which is inspired by the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the U.S.
Bill of Rights.252 The European Court of Justice likewise leaned toward the
latter approach in Sabbatini and Airola. If the general principle of equality is
concerned with more than just administrative evenhandedness, if it is
concerned with natural justice and human dignity, then the tribunals should not
have been analyzing any of the sex discrimination cases exclusively under the
formalistic similarly situated test.
b. Cases ofDifferentiation Based on Expatriation Status
The case of Ferrario, noted above, involved claims for expatriate benefits
by employees who were local nationals at the duty station in Italy.253 As local
nationals, the plaintiffs were de jure ineligible for expatriate benefits.254 More
recently, the tribunals have addressed whether such differentiation constitutes
unlawful discrimination based on national origin.
At this point, it is necessary to explain that among IGOs, the systemic
difference in benefits between nationals and residents of the host country and
expatriate employees relates to another basic principle of employment in the
international civil service, that of the geographical distribution ofjobs. Nearly
all of the IGO treaties contain a specific obligation to employ international
civil servants with "due regard" to recruitment "on as wide a geographical
basis as possible."25 Geographical distribution in employment is seen as
252 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
253 Case No. 152/81, Ferrario v. Comm'n of European Cmtys., 1983 E.C.R. 2357.
254 Id. 5.
2"5 E.g., U.N. Charter art. 101, 3; UNESCO Const. art. VI, 4; International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement (World Bank) art. V, § 5(d); Articles
of Agreement of the IMF art. XII, § 4(d); Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank
(As DB), art. 34, 6. For a slightly different, perhaps stronger, formulation of the goal of
geographical distribution, see I.L.O. Const. art. 9, 2 ("So far as is possible with due regard to
the efficiency of the work of the Office, the Director-General shall select persons of different
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essential to maintaining the legitimacy of the IGOs' work in the eyes of their
member states, but it is secondary to the essential requirement of high
standards of competence and efficiency.256
Although national origin has long been an invidious ground for
discrimination under the laws of the United States, Canada and other countries,
this differential treatment based on expatriate status within IGOs has been
viewed as necessary to the recruitment and retention of a workforce drawn
widely from the member states. In Ferrario, the ECJ endorsed these premises,
and the judgment gives no hint that anyone involved in the case, even the
plaintiffs, believed there was any prejudice at issue.257 However, tribunals
would be remiss if they simply presumed that promoting geographical
distribution is never a pretext for discriminating on the basis of national origin
or nationality, whether intentionally or not.258 The tribunals have made clear
that an organization's duty to give "due regard" to geographical distribution
is subsidiary to the mandate of highest qualifications. 9 As the consensus
around expatriate benefits began to show cracks, starting with the case of De
Armas260 from the AsDBAT in 1998, the stereotype that geographical
distribution is objectively necessary for the independence, legitimacy and
intellectual diversity of the international civil service came under scrutiny.
The De Armas case presented a broad challenge to the expatriate benefits
policies of the Asian Development Bank, based in Manila. Filipino staff
challenged as discriminatory the payment of home leave and education benefits
solely to non-Filipinos.26' The AsDBAT first ruled that such benefits do not
discriminate based on nationality, because they depend not on the citizenship
nationalities."). In marked contrast to the other international organizations, the ILO Constitution
also refers expressly to the employment of women. See id. art. 9, 3 ("A certain number of these
persons shall be women.").
256 A. LEROY BENNET& JAMES K. OLIVER, INTERNATIONALORGANIZATIONS: PRINCIPLES AND
ISSUES 416-17 (7th ed. 2002). For a detailed review of the origins and critiques of geographical
distribution, see LEMOINE, supra note 35, at 239-55.
257 Ferrario, 1983 E.C.R. 2357, 9.
258 The U.S. Civil Rights Act outlaws discrimination based on national origin, but does not
prohibit differentiation based on citizenship. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
As applied in the international administrative tribunals, the general principle of equality has not
made that distinction between national origin and nationality. Even under the U.S. approach,
however, a differentiation based on citizenship may be evidence of discrimination based on
national original, and will be unlawful if that is the purpose or effect. Id. at 92.
259 See Coates (Nos. 1 & 2), I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 1871 (1999).
260 As. D.B. Admin. Trib., Decision No. 39 (1998).
261 Id. 1.
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of a staff member but on the place where he serves, that is, his expatriate
status.262 Then the tribunal expanded upon the notion, articulated by the
IMFAT in D'Aoust, that differential treatment must not be unreasonable in
relation to a substantial and relevant difference in circumstance.2 63  The
AsDBAT wrote:
An expatriate staff member, i.e. one who serves outside his home
country, is subject to obvious disadvantages vis-c6-vis a colleague
who serves in his home country. On principle, the grant of
compensatory benefits to [expatriates] does not constitute
discrimination if such benefits are reasonably related and
proportionate to those disadvantages. 4
This test seems to have two prongs: a reasonable nexus prong similar to that
in Mould and Mr. "R ", discussed above,26 5 and a proportionality prong that is
new. The reference to the principle of proportionality was neither explained
nor applied by the tribunal in De Armas, which, as discussed below, adjudged
each of the benefits in issue based on their reasonable relation or not to the
organization's asserted interests.266  Nevertheless, this mention of
proportionality drew wide attention from the IGOs, because of its potential to
revolutionize the jurisprudence.
The French Conseil d' ttat had long used a principle of proportionality to
control administrative acts in cases involving fundamental freedoms, including
freedoms of speech, press and assembly.267 As applied in those contexts, the
proportionality principle balances the administration's legitimate interest
against the freedom being abridged, and inquires whether the administration
has used the "least drastic means" available to vindicate the administration's
interest.268 This calls to mind the U.S. Constitutional jurisprudence in First
Amendment cases, 269 and the strict scrutiny applied in cases of racial
262 Id. 33.
263 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
264 De Armas, As. D.B. No. 39, 33.
265 See supra notes 164, 169 and accompanying text.
266 De Armas, As. D.B. No. 39, 32.
267 Bermann, supra note 208, at 224 (citing, e.g., CE, May 19, 1933, [1933] Rec. Cons.
d'Et. 541, [1933] D.P. III 354).
268 Id.
269 E.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87-89 (1949).
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discrimination by government.27° In a similar way, the principle of
Verhdltnismdssigkeit is applied in German law to protect fundamental
constitutional rights, 271 and English courts have applied heightened scrutiny in
cases of interference with human rights.272
From the early 1970s, in a series of cases involving eminent domain and
urban planning, the French Conseil d'ttat applied proportionality outside the
context of fundamental civil liberties.2 73 But in those cases, the court only
required a balancing of the private interests against the public interests. It did
not require the administration to use the least drastic means of vindicating the
public interest.2 74 Subsequently, that less strict variation on proportionality
emerged in decisions from the Conseil d'ttat involving imprisonment and
deportation and disciplinary actions in the civil service.275 Similar to the
reasonable nexus test discussed above, the principle of proportionality as
applied by the Counsel d'Etat in civil service cases does not require the
administration to use the least drastic or restrictive means of achieving the
public interest.
Proportionality was imported into European Community law by the ECJ in
1970 in the case of Internationale Handelsgesellschaft.2 7 6 In that case, which
did not involve the civil service, the ECJ was confronted with a bit of rebellion
by German courts that were poised to refuse to uphold a Community export
and import licensing directive on grounds that it was disproportionate to
270 E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (strict scrutiny of de jure racial
classifications); see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (strict scrutiny of
disproportionate racial impact is appropriate only when an invidious discriminatory purpose may
be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts).
271 See David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REv. 652, 689 n. 135 (2005)
(German constitutional review for Verhdltnismdssigkeit, or proportionality, in fundamental rights
cases is conceptually similar to the U.S. Supreme Court's approach, requiring that the
government's means to a legitimate end must have the "least restrictive effect" on a
constitutional value, but in practice, the German standard has been less demanding than U.S.-
style strict scrutiny).
272 But English courts and scholars have continued to debate whether a principle of
proportionality applies in challenges to administrative actions. See CLAYTON & TOMLINSON,
supra note 22, at 286-88.
273 Bermann, supra note 208, at 224-26 (citing, e.g., CE, May 28, 1971, [1971] Rec. Cons.
d'Et. 409; CE, Oct. 20, 1972, [1972] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 657).
274 Id. at 224-25.
275 BROWN & BELL, supra note 90, at 262-63 (citing, e.g., Wahnapo, CE 27 Feb. 1981).
276 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fur
Gertreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125.
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fundamental rights in the German Constitution. 7 Even while declining to
invalidate the Community directive for violation of a member State's
constitutional principles, the ECJ announced as Community Law a principle
of proportionality that had much the same result as the German constitutional
principles.27
From the start, the ECJ applied the principle ofproportionality in a broader
range of contexts than the French and German courts from which the principle
was borrowed.27 9 Moreover, in articulating the principle, the ECJ has at some
times required only a balancing of interest, but at other times, the ECJ has
imposed the additional requirement that the least restrictive means be
utilized.2"' In this way, the ECJ essentially substitutes its judgment for that of
the other organs of the EU, at least in cases where fundamental economic
rights and other fundamental rights under Community law are at stake.
With regards to equal treatment in employment, the ECJ incorporated
proportionality into its test for sex discrimination in 1984, ruling that a
wholesale exclusion of female police officers in Northern Ireland from
policing duties that required them to be armed would infringe the requirement
of equal treatment between male and female workers if the government has not
shown that the exclusion is both appropriate and necessary for achieving
legitimate aims of public safety.' But there is a striking lack of clarity as to
the particular application of the principle of proportionality to equal treatment
in employment in the EU. Some have faulted the "deep-seated conceptual
confusion and lack of consistency" in the equal treatment cases of the ECJ and
277 Id. at Issue 2, Grounds 1-2.
278 See Law, supra note 271, at 720.
279 E.g., Case 114/76, Bela-Muhle Joset Bergmann KG v. Grows Farm Gmbh & Co. Kg,
(Skimmed-Milk Powder Case), 1977 E.C.R. 1211 (overturning scheme of milk price supports,
due to disproportionate and therefore discriminatory burden upon agricultural sectors that are
purchasers of milk).
280 E.g., Case C-i 77/99, Ampafrance SAv. Directeur des Services fiscaux de Maine-et-Loire,
2000 E.C.R. 1-7013 (overturning non-deductibility of VAT on certain mixed business and
personal expenses; control of tax evasion is legitimate purpose, but proportionality requires that
the means must have the "least possible effect" upon Community objectives of tax
harmonization). See Griinne de Bfirca, The Principle of Proportionality and Its Application in
ECLaw, 13 Y.B. EUR. L. 105 (1993).
211 Case 222/84, Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1986 E.C.R.
1651, 38. See Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v. Weber von Hartz, 1986 E.C.R. 1607,
37 (exclusion of part-time workers from private sector pension scheme would infringe the
treaty right of equal pay regardless of sex, if the exclusions affect far more women than men, the
employer has not shown a real economic need, and that the means chosen "are appropriate with
a view to achieving the objective in question and are necessary to that end").
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the EU legislation.282 Because most of the ECJ's equal treatment judgments
come from the posture of preliminary references from national courts (a kind
of advisory opinion on what Community Law requires of the national courts),
the European court's jurisprudence in this area rarely descends from broad
statements of principle to realistic adjudication of cases in controversy.
It appears that the European court's concepts of proportionality in
employment, and what is "necessary" to achieve a legitimate end, are more
flexible and less onerous for an employer, than the way that necessity is
understood under strict scrutiny analysis in the United States.283 For example,
in Enderby, the ECJ ruled that, where employer's defense to an unequal pay
claim is that market forces require certainjobs predominantly filled by men be
compensated at higher levels than comparable jobs predominantly filled by
women, then "it is for the national court to assess whether the role of market
forces in determining the rate of pay was sufficiently significant to provide the
objective justification for part or all of the difference." '284 In other words,
where the employer's economic need is sufficiently significant, it would
appear that the ECJ does not require the employer to demonstrate that its
means of addressing that need has the least possible differentiating effect as
between male and female employees. For their part, national courts in Europe
have applied the ECJ's requirement of proportionality with a realism and
balance, at times to the consternation of academics.285
Returning to the analysis of the AsDBAT in the case of De Armas, the
tribunal referred to but did not in fact apply the principle of proportionality.
286
In the same way, while the ILOAT has applied the principle of proportionality
in cases about discipline for employee misconduct,287 it has not done so in
equal treatment cases. As noted below, the IMFAT subsequently referred to
the proportionality element of the De Armas test, but also did not apply it,
282 Barnard & Hepple, supra note 3, at 583.
283 But see T.K. Hervey, Justification for Indirect Sex Discrimination in Employment:
European Community and United Kingdom Law Compared, 40 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 807, 815
(1991) ("[I]f there exists a non-discriminatory (or less discriminatory) means of achieving the
policy, then the principle of proportionality will not be satisfied.").
284 See Case C-127/92, Enderby v. Frenchay Health Auth., 1993 E.C.R. 1-5535, 28.
285 See Hervey, supra note 283, at 825 ("The UK courts appear to be in breach of Community
law by applying the different standard of 'reasonable need,' in place of the more sophisticated
principles of the Bilka test.") (emphasis added).
286 De Armas, As. D.B. Admin. Trib., Decision No. 39 (1988).
287 E.g., Kigaraba (No. 6), I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 1445 (1995); Limage (No. 3),
I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 1878 (1999).
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whereas the EBRDAT did apply the principle in one case.288 Thus, nearly a
decade after the AsDBAT first mentioned proportionality as a possible element
of the equality analysis, the principle has had little impact on the equality
jurisprudence of the international administrative tribunals.
In De Armas, the one element of the As DB's expatriate benefits that was
overturned by the tribunal was the education allowance for home country
tertiary education, as applied in cases where the child had received secondary
education in the home country.289 The AsDBAT ruled that such a child faces
no greater disadvantages than do the children of local nationals, in regard to
the relevant issue of access to tertiary education in their home countries.29
Therefore, the benefit bore no reasonable relation to the organization's interest
in compensating for the disadvantages of expatriation. 29'
In other words, while the goal of geographical distribution justified the
organization paying for those children of expatriate employees to receive
secondary education in their home countries, and therefore, to avoid
disadvantages in gaining access to home country tertiary education, it was
irrational and therefore discriminatory to pay for their home country tertiary
education, while local employees were paid no education benefits
whatsoever. 292 The tribunal thus indicated that it can be appropriate to probe
the particular circumstances of upbringing to determine whether the supposed
disadvantages of expatriation still apply and justify the differentiation in
benefits. In view of this outcome, it is interesting to revisit the case of
Ferrario, from the ECJ. 293 There, the Italian plaintiff working in Italy
complained about the inequity that his expatriate colleagues received an
allowance to send their children to higher education, whether in the home
country, a third country, or even in the duty station country, whereas he
received no allowance while incurring the same expenses for his children.2 94
While affirming the unequal treatment, the ECJ seemed troubled by the fact
that expatriate staff could receive the allowance even when they chose not to
send their children to higher education in the duty station country.295 Under
28 Mr. C., E.B.R.D. Admin. Trib., Decision 01/03 (2003).
289 De Armas, As. D.B. No. 39, 63.
290 Id. 62.
291 Id. 62-63.
292 Id.
293 See Case 152/81, Ferrario v. Comm'n of the European Cmtys., 1983 E.C.R. 2357 (1983),
supra note 154 and accompanying text.
294 Id. 1.
295 Id. 13 ("The Applicants were therefore quite correct to concentrate their argument on
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the analysis in De Armas, it would be appropriate for the tribunal to probe
whether the older children of expatriate staff face disadvantages of
expatriation, compared to local nationals, sufficient to justify the
differentiation in benefits in that circumstance.
Moreover, according to Van den Broeck,2" it may be relevant to the
tribunal's analysis that the difference in circumstance which supposedly
justifies the differential treatment turns upon the volitional acts of the staff
members. Thus, by choosing to send their children for higher education in
Italy, when they could have gone to the home country or a third country, the
expatriate staff in Ferrario seemed to indicate that the disadvantages of
expatriation for those children were outweighed by other factors. If so, then
just as the organization was correct under the ECJ's analysis to terminate
expatriate benefits in Van den Broeck for female staff who chose the benefits
of local citizenship upon marriage, so too it may have been justifiable to deny
education benefits for expatriates who chose to send their children for higher
education in the duty station country. However, the fact that the organization
reasonably could have denied the education benefits to those expatriate staff
in that circumstance does not necessarily mean it was unreasonable and
discriminatory in granting those benefits while refusing them to local
nationals.
In Ferrario, the European court sought solace in the fact that very few
expatriates had utilized the option of higher education in the duty station
country.297 This is reminiscent of the lesson from De Los Cobos, that it is
sufficient if the difference in treatment relates to a difference in circumstance
that exists in the large.298 The analysis suggests that the outcome in Ferrario
would have been different if a majority or sizable minority of expatriate staff
had elected to educate their children in Italy. Thus, under the general principle
of equality, it seems that the reasonableness and legality of systematic
differential treatment can turn on the peculiar facts of a given organization at
a given time.
Four years after De Armas, the expatriate benefits at the IMF were
challenged in the case of Ms. "G".299 The organization's rules denied
cases in which children of employees entitled to the expatriation allowance also pursue their
higher education in the country in which the parent is employed.").
296 See Case 37/74, Van den Broeck v. Comm'n of the European Cmtys., 1975 E.C.R. 235,
supra note 220 and accompanying text.
297 Ferrario, 1983 E.C.R. 2357, 12.
298 De Los Cobos, I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 391, 9 (1980).
299 I.M.F. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2002-3 (2002).
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expatriate benefits to nationals as well as permanent residents of the duty
station country.300 The plaintiff in Ms. "G "worked at IMF headquarters in the
United States and was a lawful permanent resident of the United States, i.e.,
she held a so-called "green card.",301 She challenged her ineligibility for
expatriate benefits on grounds that the permanent residency test discriminates
against her vis-6T-vis other non-U.S. colleagues who were not permanent
residents."a 2
Applying the IMFAT's burden-shifting framework announced in Mr. "R ",
the plaintiff had met her burden of making a prima facie case of unequal
treatment. 0 3  Although not discussed in the tribunal's judgment, the
organization evidently met its burden of producing evidence of legitimate
purposes for the differentiation in benefits, undoubtedly because of its treaty
obligation to give "due regard" to geographical distribution in employment.3"
Much of the opinion in Ms. "G" focused on the final element of the
tribunal's burden-shifting framework, i.e., "whether there is a rational nexus
between the goals of the expatriate benefits policy.., and [the organization's]
method [of] allocating these benefits.""3 5 The asserted goals of expatriate
benefits were to recruit and retain a staff of diverse nationalities, to
compensate expatriate staff for costs associated with maintaining and renewing
ties with their home countries, and to facilitate their repatriation following
service with the organization. 3" The IFAT reviewed at length the process
followed in reaching the decision not to pay expatriate benefits to permanent
residents of the duty station country, implying again that the reasonableness
of the degree of differentiation depends on the process for reaching the
decision. The tribunal concluded that total denial of expatriate benefits to
permanent residents was reasonable, because "[t]he procedure of selecting it
was not arbitrary but deliberate [and] the substance of the Fund's choice is
rational and defensible. 30 7
Nowhere in its judgment in Ms. "G" did the IMFAT suggest that the
organization was under any obligation to choose the least discriminatory
means of achieving its legitimate objectives. On the contrary, the tribunal
300 Id. 2.
301 Id. 10.
302 Id. 14.
303 Id.
304 See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
305 Ms. "G", I.M.F. No. 2002-3, 79.
306 Id.
307 Id. 80.
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indicated in Ms. "G" that it considered a more reasonable approach would
have been a strict nationality criterion, which would have allowed expatriate
benefits to permanent residents." 8  Thus, the reasonable nexus test
acknowledges that where there is more than one reasonable degree of
differential treatment the organization has discretion to choose among them.
In Mr. "R ", the IMFAT had discussed the principle of proportionality as
articulated in the De Armas decision from the A.S.D.B.A.T.:
[T]he standard set forth in De Armas was that, to be upheld as
nondiscriminatory, the expatriate benefits were required not only
to be "reasonably related" to but also "proportionate" to the
disadvantages of expatriation. This standard, is maybe observed,
subjects the decision under review to a relatively high degree of
scrutiny.
... [S]hould the Tribunal choose to apply the standard articulated
in De Armas, it would consider whether the difference in
benefits .. is not only reasonably related but proportionate to
greater disadvantages faced by Resident Representatives than
[plaintiff] posted abroad, or whether the disparity may be
justified by some other valid distinction between the two
categories of staff.309
Thus, the IMFAT described how it would apply the principle of
proportionality should it choose to do so. But just as the AsDBAT did not
apply the principle in De Armas, the IMFAT did not choose to apply it in the
case of Mr. "R ". It may be inferred that the IMFAT did not even adopt
proportionality into its framework for equal treatment. In the subsequent case
of Ms. "G ", although it was analyzing a question of eligibility for expatriate
benefits similar to that in DeArmas, and although it recited the burden-shifting
framework announced in Mr. "R ", the IMFAT omitted any mention from Ms.
"G'" of the De Armas case or the principle of proportionality.
The only case that arguably applied the principle of proportionality in an
equal treatment analysis came from the Administrative Tribunal of the EBRD,
based in London. In the case of Mr. C, a staff member of UK nationality
308 Id.
309 Mr. "R", I.M.F. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2002-1, 44, 47.
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sought benefits payable to expatriates.3"' The EBRDAT relied upon the
burden-shifting framework of the IMFAT in Mr. "R ", but explicitly adopted
proportionality as part of the final element of the framework."' First, the
tribunal found the plaintiff had made a prima facie case of unequal treatment
based upon the status of expatriation." 2 Second, the tribunal found the
organization had shown a legitimate purpose for the differential treatment,
which was to recruit and retain staff of diverse nationalities and to compensate
expatriate staff for the disruption of relocating to London." 3 Third, the
EBRDAT considered whether policies denying expatriate benefits to UK
nationals "are rationally related to their purpose and whether they are
proportionate to the disadvantages experienced by the expatriates and thus to
the achievement of the purpose." '3 14 In line with De Armas, the EBRDAT
analyzed each form of benefit separately and concluded that most of them were
"reasonably related.., and... proportionate to the disadvantages experienced
by expatriates and thus to the achievement of the [organization's] aim." '315
However, one aspect of the EBRD's policy on expatriate benefits was
found disproportionate and not reasonably related to the organization's
legitimate aim-a 2003 amendment to the policy that allowed certain
education benefits for the children of expatriate staff to continue even after a
staff member acquired UK nationality. The EBRDAT considered that this was
at odds with the central thrust of the organization's justification for the
education benefits, namely, to compensate for disadvantages peculiarly
experienced by expatriates in educating their children while working outside
the home country.3
16
The EBRDAT noted that this feature of the policy had been adopted as part
of a package of measures, including an expansion of eligibility to cover UK
nationals who were recruited by the EBRD from abroad, in partial response to
concerns by UK employees about the disparity in benefits between themselves
and their expatriate colleagues whose actual family circumstances were
310 E.B.R.D. Admin. Trib. 01/3 1 (2004).
311 Id. 88, See id. 955-60.
312 See id. 85.
313 Id. 9 87-88.
314 Id. 9 88.
3' Id. 90, 92.
316 Id. 93(6).
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similar.317 The tribunal suggested that, if discrimination against UK nationals
was a concern, then the organization's response was inadequate."' 8
The EBRDAT's amended eligibility rules may be summarized as a
nationality-or-residence test. Staff could be eligible for these benefits if they
were either non-UK nationals or non-UK residents at the time of recruitment,
leaving only the UK resident nationals left out of the benefits. Having framed
the organization's legitimate purpose as the recruitment and retention of
expatriate staff, not only at the time of recruitment but on an ongoing basis, the
EBRDAT naturally ruled that purpose was not rationally or proportionately
served by the continuation of education benefits after UK nationality was
acquired.319
A possiblejustification for the EBRD's amended rules would have been the
diversity benefits of recruiting and retaining staff who had made their homes
outside the UK until accepting a position with the EBRD in London, on the
presumption that, whatever their nationality, such staff would bring a diversity
of experiences and intellectual backgrounds to enrich the work of the
organization. It is not clear from the judgment whether the organization failed
to plead this as a new objective of the amended benefits policy, or whether the
tribunal considered it an illegitimate or insubstantial purpose for the
organization's differential treatment of staff. It is likely that the ill-defined
benefits of diversity would be judged insufficient to justify this differential
treatment.320
In summary, claims challenging expatriate benefits as discriminatory on the
basis of nationality or residence have only succeeded in eroding those benefits
at the margins. Quite unlike the gender discrimination cases, the international
administrative tribunals have had no epiphany about the potentially
discriminatory aspects of expatriate benefits. Because this category of
differential treatment is grounded in the organizations' obligations under their
constitutive treaties to recruit and retain a geographically diverse staff, the
tribunals may be appropriately reluctant to put their general principle of
317 See id. 30, 93(6), 93(8).
311 See id. 93(6).
319 Id.
320 Indeed, such an approach could be viewed as evidence of national origin discrimination.
By paying these benefits to foreign nationals who acquire local nationality, and to local nationals
who were recruited from outside the country, such a broad differentiation without regard to
individual merit implies there is something innately undesirable about the local nationals of the
host country who have not been living abroad. Cf id. 61-62, 64-67 (summarizing
Appellant's main argument).
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equality squarely into conflict with those treaty-based rules. The tribunals'
judgments in these cases have not probed beyond that de jure distinction to
explain why those obligations are either non-justiciable based as they are in the
IGOs' constituent treaties, or legallyjustified despite their roots in stereotypes
about the supposedly immutable national loyalties and nationality based
characteristics of international civil servants.
It may be significant that, in these cases about expatriate benefits, the
plaintiffs have not played to the moral aspect of the principle of equality; they
have not portrayed themselves as persecuted or disadvantaged minorities
seeking treatment as equals. As a factual matter, considering that most of the
IGOs are based in Western Europe or the United States, where the local
nationals have obvious advantages compared to many colleagues from
developing countries or non-Western societies, the local nationals of these
organizations could have a difficult time making the moral case that this
differential treatment leaves them disadvantaged vis-6-vis their expatriate
colleagues.
c. Cases of Discrimination in Favor of Marriage
We have already seen, in cases like Taylor-Ungaro, Sabbatini and Mould,
that international organizations pay a variety of benefits to a staff member's
spouse that are not payable to partners of unmarried employees. These
benefits include subsidized medical insurance for the spouse, a subsidized
pension to the surviving spouse, the costs of certain spouse-accompanied
business travel, and, for expatriate staff, the costs of travel between the duty
station and the home country.32" ' Since the late 1990s, many IGOs have
adopted some form of domestic partner benefits, whereby registered domestic
partners can become eligible for many of these benefits on the same basis as
a spouse.322 However, certain spousal benefits such as the subsidized surviving
spouse pension, remain off limits to domestic partners in many IGOs.
International organizations have long taken a flexible approach to the
definition of a marriage for purposes of these spousal benefits. Common law
marriages, traditional marriages, and other de facto marriages were recognized
as a matter of practice and policy, with employees bearing some burden to
prove that the marriages were recognized under the law of the staff member's
32 See Taylor-Ungaro, I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 167 (1970); Case 20/71, Sabbatini
v. European Parl., 1972 E.C.R. 345; Mould, W.B. Admin. Trib., Decision No. 210 (1999).
322 E.g., Adrian, U.N. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 1183, at IV (2004).
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home country.323 As the UNAT has written: "This flexible approach is
consistent with the Organization's appreciation of the world's many cultures
and reflects the truth that there is no common understanding of the word
spouse among the peoples of the world. 324
Although the IGOs are not bound by the marriage laws of their host
countries or any member states, their flexible approach to defining marriage
has looked to the law of the state where the marriage originated, usually the
employee's home country.3 25 Because the laws of every country recognize
opposite-sex marriage in some form, this approach did not pose difficulties
under the principle of equality until unmarried opposite-sex couples and same
sex couples gained visibility in more recent years.
Employee benefits tied to marriage can be problematic on a number of
fronts. First, there is the prospect of abuse by the employee, both in the initial
determination of the existence of a de facto marriage in the absence of
objective evidence, and in the continuation of benefits in respect of a sham
marriage.
Second, tying the organization's recognition of a marriage to the law of the
employee's home country carries the potential to import, into the
organization's internal benefits practices, discrimination that exists in national
laws. This was seen in a different context in Kiewning-Korner Castronovo
from the ILOAT and Airola and Van den Broeck from the ECJ,326 where
benefits were impacted by national laws imposing citizenship on female
expatriates upon marriage but not male expatriates.
Third, from a practical perspective, proving what is the marriage law of any
given country and how that law applies to the facts of a particular case is no
straightforward matter. Plaintiffs often are not represented by counsel, and
when they are, it usually will be counsel licensed to practice in the duty station
country, and not necessarily in the plaintiffs home country. Nor are the
defendant IGOs or the judges on the tribunals experts in the local laws of all
member states. Thus, there are risks of error of both law and fact that could
323 Geyer (No. 2), I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 1715, 10 (1998). See Berghuys, U.N.
Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 1063, at 11-Ill (2002).
324 Berghuys, U.N. No. 1063, at III.
325 See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
326 Kiewning-Korner Castronovo, I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 167 (1970);
Case 21/74, Airola v. Comm'n of European Cmtys., 1975 E.C.R. 221; Case 37/74, Van den
Broeck v. Comm'n of the European Cmtys., 1975 E.C.R. 235. See supra notes 135,218-21 and
accompanying text.
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have substantial consequences upon both the livelihoods of the affected staff
members and the equality of treatment among similarly situated employees.
Finally, there are the questions of why, and within what limits, an
international organization can be said to have a legitimate interest in favoring
marriage over other nonmarital relationships, or indeed, subsidizing any staff
member who is in a relationship compared to those who are single.
Some of these problems can be illustrated with the case of Geyer (No. 2) in
1998 from the ILOAT.327 The Geyer case involved an employee who sought
certain spousal benefits for a woman he claimed as his wife. Although the
employee, a South African national, had no marriage certificate he asserted
that his marriage had been solemnized in a traditional ceremony consistent
with local practice.32 The BLOAT endorsed the policy equating traditional
marriages and other "de facto situations" with formal marriage, for which
entitlement to spousal benefits would arise.329 However, the tribunal ruled
that, as an evidentiary matter, the plaintiff had not met his burden of proving
that a traditional marriage existed.33°
Little is disclosed in the judgment about what evidence was presented by
the plaintiff or the organization regarding the standards for a traditional
marriage under South African law. Rather, it appears that the plaintiffs
inconsistent treatment of his marriage when filling-out certain employment
forms decisively discredited his marriage claim.
Significantly, at no point did the tribunal question the bona fides of his
relationship with the woman claimed as his wife. Yet, nor was the tribunal
bothered by the fact that the question of the existence of this de facto
marriage-a formality that, by definition, is informal-should be
determinative of the plaintiffs entitlement to substantial benefits that were
payable to others performing the same work.
Other problems with marital benefits were seen in the Mould case from the
WBAT in 1999."3' There, the plaintiff and his wife were legally separated and
living on different sides of the Atlantic Ocean.332 Although the marriage was
effectively over, until a divorce was finalized, the estranged spouse retained
eligibility for a subsidized pension of her own if she should be the surviving
327 Geyer (No. 2), I.L.O. 1715.
328 Id. 4.
329 Id. 10.
330 Id. 1.
331 See Mould, W.B. Admin. Trib., Decision No. 210 (1999), supra note 164 and
accompanying text.
332 Id. 2.
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spouse.333 The inequity of this is patent when compared to the categorical
prohibition against a subsidized survivor pension to the non-marital partners
in bona fide relationships of commitment and succor.
Somewhat to his credit, the plaintiff in Mould sought to normalize the
situation with a ruling that his wife retained eligibility after divorce, due to her
many years in the marriage while he was working at the Bank and the
substantial sums they contributed from his paycheck to the pension plan.334 He
claimed discrimination against divorced couples, but the WBAT dismissed the
plea summarily, with no substantive analysis.335 The outcome in Mouldturned
formalistically on marital status and the interpretation of the term "spouse." '336
This is not to say that a more substantive inquiry would or should have
changed the outcome in that case. But it is notable that, in 1999, the World
Bank tribunal was not going to question the premise that a marriage gives rise
to privileges in employment benefits, no matter the de facto status of the
relationship.
In two judgments, the UNAT has taken a similarly formalistic approach to
the meaning of "spouse" in the context of claims for benefits on behalf of same
sex registered domestic partners.3 37 In the Berghuys case from 2002, the
UNAT ruled there was no discrimination in refusing a surviving spouse
pension benefit to the Dutch domestic partner of a deceased international civil
servant. 33' The tribunal ruled that the word "spouse" in the applicable
regulation is linked to a pledge of marriage, and a registered domestic
partnership is not a marriage under Dutch law.339
While noting the organization's policy of recognizing de facto marriages,
and that a Dutch registered domestic partnership was the closest approximation
to marriage for the plaintiff and his partner under Dutch law at the time, the
UNAT in Berghuys nevertheless considered that they were not similarly
situated to a de facto married couple.34 ° With no irony, the tribunal observed
333 Id. 13.
334 Id. 2, 4.
335 Id. 27.
336 Id.
33' Berghuys, U.N. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 1063 (2000).
338 Id.
319 Id. at VIII; see also Case C-122/99, D v. Council of E.U., 2001 E.C.R. 111-4319,
Grounds 2 (ruling no infringement of the right to equal treatment in the denial, from an employee
in a same sex domestic partnership registered under Swedish law, of certain allowances that are
payable by the European Communities to "a married official").
340 Berghuys, U.N. No. 63, at VII.
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that subsequent to the death of the plaintiff s partner, the Netherlands enacted
legislation recognizing same sex marriages, thereby confirming, in the
tribunal's mind, that domestic partnership is neither identical nor sufficiently
similar to marriage so as to pose a problem of unequal treatment in spousal
benefits.341
The UNAT's analysis stands in contrast to that of the Canadian Supreme
Court in Miron, discussed below, which concluded that there was no
substantive reason to deny automobile insurance benefits to the unmarried
opposite-sex couple who were the plaintiffs in the case, and therefore, the
principle of equality requires that the word "spouse" in the legislative scheme
be interpreted to include the plaintiffs.342 The Berghuys case involved another
type of insurance scheme, that of the UN Joint Staff Pension Fund (UNJSPF),
based in New York, to which the decedent had paid contributions from his
salary.343 The decedent worked for the 1LO in Geneva. Despite the fact that
both the UNJSPF and the LO were immune from Dutch marriage law, and
despite the fact that neither entity had a legal obligation to look to Dutch
marriage law alone when interpreting the word "spouse" in the UNJSPF
regulations, the UNAT formalistically determined that Dutch marriage law
should govern the issue and, because the plaintiff's Dutch domestic partnership
with the decedent was not a marriage under Dutch law, there was no denial of
equal treatment.3"
A similar outcome was reached by the UNAT in the case of Adrian, from
2004.34' That case involved the claim of a UN staff member working in
Nairobi for spousal benefits for his same sex partner, with whom he had
entered into a French domestic partnership (PACS) in 2000.346 While the
tribunal noted that the UN Secretary General recently had announced the
recognition of domestic partnerships for most spousal benefits (but not the
surviving spouse pension), the new policy did not alter the UNAT's analysis
of the plaintiff's non-eligibility prior to that announcement.3 47 Even while
asserting that the Secretary General's recently changed position was "the only
one" that allows for the coexistence of conflicting conceptions regarding
family relations, "since it accepts both polygamous unions and same-sex
341 Id. at VI.
342 Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418 (Can.); see infra note 401 and accompanying text.
34' Berghuys, U.N. No. 63.
144 Id. at VII.
345 U.N. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 1183 (2004).
346 Id.
347 Id. at IV.
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unions," '348 the tribunal would not fault the Secretary General for having failed
to recognize domestic partnerships sooner. Nor did the UNAT consider that
the principle of equality required that the change be given retrospective effect
so as to compensate the plaintiff employee for the past deprivation of the
benefit.349
In the case of Mr. R. A.-O. from 2003, the ILOAT reached the same
outcome as the UNAT in its own case concerning benefits in respect of a
French PACS 5 ° In this PACS case, decided by three votes to two, the
majority relied upon the Geyer case311 to hold that the word "spouse" under the
applicable staff rules is linked to the institution of marriage, and a PACS is not
a marriage under French law.352 The majority wrote:
It cannot be said on the basis of the French texts submitted in the
present case that the PACS is a form of marriage. On the
contrary, these texts draw a clear distinction between spouses
bound by marriage and partners bound by a PACS, since it is
only by virtue of special provisions that the latter are entitled to
certain benefits available to spouses.353
In these threejudgments, the differential payment of employee benefits was
deemed appropriate because Dutch and French law placed the plaintiffs dejure
into a different category than comparable married staff members. To that
extent, the judgments are reminiscent of Kiewning-Korner Castronovo, the
ILOAT's 1970 decision upholding the termination of expatriate benefits from
a female staff member by operation of the gender discriminatory Italian law
that imposed Italian citizenship upon her marriage to a local national, and
thereby placed her de jure into a different category than her male colleagues
also married to local nationals.354
However, in Airola, the ECJ had overturned a similar termination of
expatriate benefits, precisely because the organization's blind deference to the
effects of the Italian law introduced into its own benefits policies an
348 Id. at X.
149 Id. at XI.
350 Mr. R.A.-O., I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2193 (2003).
311 See Geyer (No. 2), I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 1715 (1998).
352 Id. 1J0.
313 Id. at Consideration 10.
314 Kiewning-Komer Castronovo, I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 170 (1970).
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
unwarranted difference in treatment between men and women.355 InAirola, the
ECJ required the organization to interpret the concept of "nationality" in such
a way as to eliminate the sex discrimination that was introduced by
discriminatory national laws.356
Similarly, in these three cases about spousal benefits for same sex unions,
the UNAT and the ILOAT could have required the organizations to interpret
the concept of "spouse" so as to eliminate the asserted discrimination, if the
tribunals had felt that there was improper discrimination. After all, the IGOs
had always taken a flexible approach to defining marriage for purposes of
eligibility for benefits.357 Their practices and policies of recognizing marriage
by reference to the laws of the employee's home country were more an
administrative convenience to the organizations than anything else, which
historically did not pose equal treatment problems because every state
recognizes opposite-sex marriage in some form.
These three judgments do not meaningfully address the core claims of
discrimination, or the long line of cases from Sabbatini to De Armas358 and
beyond, holding that it is necessary to look past de jure classifications and
inquire whether the differential treatment is based on substantial and relevant
differences in circumstance and bears a reasonable nexus to those differences.
Nor was there any cognizance that the IGOs' practice of defining eligibility for
employment benefits by reference to the laws of the employee's home country
could be flawed when the countries and subnational jurisdictions differ
radically in their legal recognition of unmarried couples.
Writing in dissent in the case of Mr. R.A.-O., Judge Rond6n de Sans6, from
Venezuela, criticized the majority's semantic interpretation.359 While she
agreed it was permissible that spousal status, for benefits purposes, could be
determined by the law of the staff member's home country, she opined that
municipal law and the employer's policies must be interpreted broadly in light
of their objectives."' Of the concept of "spouse," she wrote that for purposes
of benefits in an IGO:
311 Case 21/74, Airola v. Comm'n of the European Cmtys., 1975 E.C.R. 221.
356 Id. 12.
117 E.g., Geyer (No. 2), I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 1718, 10 (1998).
311 See supra notes 209, 260 and accompanying text.
319 Mr. R.A.-O., I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2193 (2003) (Rond6n de Sans6, J.,
dissenting).
360 Id.
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I consider that this concept should be taken to mean a stable
partner bound to the staff member by a permanent relationship
which is not prohibited by law but which, on the contrary, is
expressly authorised and provided for by specific legislation. To
deny that status to an individual who is in a relationship
recognised by the state and evidenced by an official document
would be to disregard the validity not only of that document, but
also of the law establishing it.3
61
In other words, as far as is relevant to the employer's legitimate reasons for
paying spousal benefits, the French PACS and other forms of registered
domestic partnership are sufficiently similar to civil marriage so as to render
irrational, and thus, unlawfully discriminatory, the denial of such spousal
benefits to employees in domestic partnerships. Apart from the political
firestorm that erupted in the U.N. General Assembly over the question of same
sex domestic partnership benefits, 362 the IGOs offered no substantial reason
why they had an interest in favoring employees who were married over
similarly situated employees who were in legally recognized nonmarital
relationships of commitment and succor.363
Following the divided judgment in Mr. R.A.-O., the ILOAT came together
in the two most recent judgments concerning the payment of spousal benefits
for same sex couples. In Mrs. A.H.R.C.-J364 and Mr. D.B.,365 both announced
in July 2006, the ILOAT overturned the ILO's denial of spousal benefits in
respect of domestic partnerships registered under Danish and German law,
respectively. Rejecting the organization's reliance upon Geyer and Mr. R.A.-
361 Id.
362 See Adrian, U.N. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 1183, at IX (2004).
363 Evidently, neither of the IGOs involved in these cases, nor a substantial number of states
in the UN General Assembly, endorsed the faith-based justifications offered by theocratic states
for their "denunciation" of and "extreme opposition" to same sex domestic partnership benefits
in the U.N. See id. The UNAT's opinion in Adrian makes clear that the opposition in the
General Assembly was led by representatives of Saudi Arabia and the Holy See, and that their
presentations mainly relied upon the theological traditions that their governments represent,
respectively, Wahhabist Islam and Roman Catholic Christianity. Id. at IX. While it is unclear
whether theology could serve as a legitimate reason for a legislative organ of an IGO, such as
the General Assembly, there is little doubt that international administrative tribunals would
disallow such justifications if offered by the U.N. Secretariat and the administrations of other
IGOs.
'6 I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2549 (2006).
365 I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2550 (2006).
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0., the tribunal ruled that the Danish and German plaintiffs had proven that
their domestic partnerships were sufficiently similar to marriage under the
relevant national laws as to entitle them to recognition for their partners as
"spouses" under the organization's rules.366
In so ruling, the ILOAT stood by its analysis in Mr. R.A.-O., where the
tribunal had declined to recognize the French domestic partner as a spouse
because the French laws "draw a clear distinction between spouses bound by
marriage and partners bound by a PACS. 367 Yet the tribunal acknowledged
in Mrs. A.H.R. C.-J. that Danish law likewise "draws a distinction between the
'registered partnership' [and] marriage.,,16' And in Mr. D.B., the ILOAT
referred to the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court which
similarly declared that a German domestic partnership "[was] not a
marriage.,,169 Thus, it is clear that the laws of Denmark and Germany, as with
France, draw a clear distinction between marriage and domestic partnership.
However, in the latter two cases, the tribunal conducted an inquiry into the
substance of those Danish and German laws, and concluded that the
differences between marriage and domestic partnership under Danish and
German law are "extremely tenuous."37 No comparison was made between
the Danish and German domestic partnership laws and the French PACS.
Nevertheless, the tribunal ruled that the organization's differential treatment
could not be justified by the distinctions between marriage and domestic
partnership in the Danish and German laws.37 '
Thus, there are conflicting results among five cases concerning spousal
benefits for same sex couples, all supposedly decided in line with the same
general principle of equality. Obviously, this is a problematic jurisprudence.
It is no answer that in the latter two cases, the circumstance of domestic
partners and married persons under the laws of Denmark and Germany were
deemed similarly situated. From all five of the judgments, it is evident that the
differences between the domestic partnership laws of the France and the
Netherlands, on the one hand, and Denmark and Germany, on the other hand,
'66 Mr. D.B., I.L.O. No. 2550, 4.
367 Mr. R.A.-O., I.L.O. Admin. Trib., I.L.O. Judgment No. 2193, 10 (2003).
368 Mrs. A.H.R.C.-J., I.L.O. No. 2549, 12.
369 Mr. D.B., I.L.O. No. 2550, 4.
370 Id. 12; Mrs. A.H.R.C.-J., I.L.O. No. 2550, 12.
371 Mr. D.B., I.L.O. No. 2550, 5; Mrs. A.H.R.C.-J, I.L.O. No. 2550, 12.
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are even more "extremely tenuous 37 2 than the differences between any of
those laws and the marriage laws in those countries.37 3
In its judgment in Mrs. A.H.R.C.-J., the ILOAT hinted that the different
result in the two most recent cases related to an intervening change in practice
within the relevant organization, the ILO.374 Subsequent to the tribunal's
judgment in Mr. R.A.-O., the organization had interpreted the term "spouse"
to include same sex marriages where the legislation of the country of the staff
member's nationality recognizes such marriages.37 5 Seizing on what it termed
this "broad interpretation" of the term "spouse," the ILOAT reframed the
question as whether, having taken that step, the organization was bound to
recognize other same sex unions that were not expressly designated as
marriages under the applicable national law.376
Seeming to acknowledge the validity of the criticism from Judge Rond6n
de Sans6, in dissent in Mr. R.A.-O., the ILOAT wrote:
The Tribunal feels that a purely nominalistic approach to this
issue would be excessively formalistic and is inappropriate in
view of the fact that the situation varies from one country to
another and that great care must be taken not to treat officials
placed in comparable situations unequally: it is not because a
country has opted for legislation that admits same-sex unions
while refusing to describe them as marriages that officials
who are nationals of that State should necessarily be denied
certain rights.377
However, whereas Judge Rond6n de Sans6 seemed prepared to take
judicial notice that, as far as is relevant to the organization's benefits schemes,
all lawfully registered domestic partnerships are similarly situated to
marriages, a majority on the ILOAT continued to adhere to the rule in Geyer,
requiring individual plaintiffs to prove the "precise provisions" of local law on
372 Mr. D.B., I.L.O. No. 2550, 5.
71 For a discussion of the history of the same sex PACS in France and comparisons to the
French treatment of marriage and opposite-sex cohabitation outside marriage, see Claudina
Richards, The Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Couples-The French Perspective, 51 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 305 (2002).
114 Mrs. A.H.R.C.-J, I.L.O. No. 2549, 10.
375 Id.
376 Id. 1 1.
377 Id.
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domestic partnerships and marriage, and their application in his or her
situation.378
It must be assumed that, upon the required evidentiary showings, the
ILOAT would admit that staff in French PACS relationships or in Dutch
registered domestic partnerships would be eligible for equal treatment on the
same basis as their Danish and German colleagues, notwithstanding the
undisturbed precedents in Mr. R.A.-O., Berghuys and Adrian. If so, then, just
as the ILOAT's judgment in Callewaert-Haezebrouck covertly overturned its
precedent in Taylor- Ungaro without repudiating it,"' likewise the companion
judgments in Mrs. A.H.R.C.-J. and Mr. D.B. have covertly overturned the
precedent of Mr. R.A-O. The unthinkable alternative would be that the French
PACS has been condemned to inferior status within the employee benefits
policies of IGOs, compared to Danish and German domestic partnerships
because of subtle differences in national law that have not been established to
be relevant to the organizations' purposes in offering spousal benefits.
Just as the reasons behind Callewaert-Haezebrouck could be inferred from
other tribunal cases involving less controversial subject matter, like De Los
Cobos, similarly one must look to the otherjurisprudence on discrimination for
the logic in Mrs. A.H.R.C.-J. and Mr. D.B. The ILOAT had previously
accepted, in De Los Cobos, that dejure classifications are not sufficient to
justify differential treatment, and there must be a difference in circumstance
that is substantial and relevant to the organization's legitimate purpose. 380 This
iteration of the similarly situated test was significantly elaborated by the
IMFAT cases ofD 'Aoust, Mr. "R" and Ms. "G ", as well as De Armas from
the AsDBAT and Mr. C. from the EBRDAT.
Further, the ILOAT had previously indicated in Raboz& that, when
benefits are tied to employees' personal relationships, then the reality of the
plaintiffs relationship should be assessed to see whether it effectively is the
same as that of her comparators who were treated differently.31' The tribunal
wrote that, in offering spousal benefits, the organization's policies must reflect
"the actual situation of the spouses, who owe each other a duty of mutual
assistance and who... may be regarded as mutually dependent. 31 2 Registered
domestic partners likewise owe to each other a legal duty of mutual assistance
378 Id. 10.
... See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
380 De Los Cobos, I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 391, 9 (1980).
38' Rabozde, I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 264 (1975).
382 Id.
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in many jurisdictions that recognize domestic partnership, and they may be
regarded as mutually dependent in fact. 3 '
Accordingly, there seems to be three possible logics underlying the
judgments in Mrs. A. H. R.C.-J. and Mr. D.B. First, and most narrowly, it could
be that the tribunal concluded that the actual situation of the same sex
registered domestic partner plaintiffs is not substantially different from the
situation of married staff members in a way that is relevant to an international
organization's legitimate purposes in offering spousal benefits. Second, the
tribunal may have determined that the organization's complete denial of
spousal benefits is an unreasonable response in relation to the subtle
differences between marriage and domestic partnership under the applicable
laws. Third, and most broadly, the tribunal may have decided, in line with a
number of courts in North America, that the general principle of equality
demands that committed same sex couples must be afforded on equal terms the
same rights and benefits enjoyed by married opposite-sex couples. 4
Absent clear guidance from the tribunal on the reasons for the outcomes of
Mrs. A.H.R.C.-J. and Mr. D.B., as opposed to the three prior judgments on
similar facts, these cases may have limited influence within international
organizations, just as the sex discrimination cases in the 1970s did not
necessarily eliminate discrimination against women.3" 5 Both the IGOs and
their employees have no certainty about the present state of the general
principle of equality as applied to same sex couples or, for that matter,
opposite-sex unmarried couples. Moreover, because the cases seemingly
turned on their particular facts, there is no clear legal impetus for the
organizations to proactively amend their rules in order to assure equal
treatment in benefits to employees who have nonmarital partners.
Even more uncertain is how the ILOAT's approach would be applied to
nationals of a state that changes its law to abolish domestic partnership or same
sex marriage. Such measures have been considered in both Canada and
383 See Robert Wintermute, Same-Sex Marriage: When Will It Reach Utah?, 20 B.Y.U. J.
PUB. L. 527, 532-33 (2006).
3' Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196,220-21 (N.J. 2006); see also Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44
(Haw. 1993); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 870, 886 (Vt. 1999); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003); Halpern v. Can., [2000] 65 O.R. (3d) 161 (Can.);
Barbeau v. B.C., [2003] 15 B.C.L.R. (4th) 226 (Can.). For a view on equality for same sex
couples under English constitutional analysis, see Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Ass'n Ltd.,
[1999] W.L. 852150 (H2) (Ward, L.J., dissenting).
35 See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
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Massachusetts.386 The legal standard becomes even more confused when
applied to a federal state, such as the United States or Canada, where
subnational units may differ with each other and with the federal government
in their approaches to both domestic partnership and same sex marriage. The
dynamic state of national and subnational laws in this area makes keeping
track of it a Herculean task. To purport to distinguish among the various laws
on domestic partnerships, and their relative similarity to marriage in each
jurisdiction, seems a truly impractical judicial approach.
Another issue left open by ILOAT in these most recent judgments is the
effect, if any, of a "volitional act" on the part of the staff member, as in Van
den Broeck.387 Consider two scenarios. First, consider that the Netherlands
has now legalized both domestic partnership and civil marriage for same sex
couples.388 In Berghuys, the UNAT noted this fact as a reason why Dutch
domestic partners were deemed not similarly situated to Dutch married
persons.389 The question is whether the ILOAT would hold that a staff member
who chose Dutch domestic partnership instead of Dutch marriage would
thereby disqualify himself from equal treatment in spousal benefits. From a
purely formalist perspective, the answer should be "yes." But after the
judgments in Mrs. A.H.R.C.-J. and Mr. D.B., applying a substantive similarly
situated analysis, the answer would seem to be "no" because the organization's
interest in paying spousal benefits is the same for Dutch domestic partnership
as for Dutch marriage, the subtle differences between the two legal institutions
are not relevant to the organization's interest, and those differences do not
justify a complete denial of benefits from one of the two classes of employees.
Yet this outcome is far from certain.
Second, consider the relative ease and informality by which a staff member
can change his place of residence in a federal state. In the United States, for
example, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut and New Jersey provide same
sex couples with legal recognition equivalent to marriage,39 whereas the
386 See Christopher Mason, Gay Marriage Galvanizes Canada's Right, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 19, 2006; Michael Powell & Robin Shuman, Mass Gay Marriage Law Contested, WASH.
POST, Jan. 3, 2007, at A3.
"' See Case 37/74, Van den Broeck v. Comm'n of the European Cmtys., 1975 E.C.R. 235,
supra note 220 and accompanying text.
388 See Berghuys, U.N. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 1063 (2002), supra note 337 and
accompanying text.
389 Id.
390 See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2000); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.22 941 (Mass. 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-38aa to 38pp (2005); VT. STAT. ANN.
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neighboring states of Pennsylvania and New York provide no equivalent legal
recognition, and New York City provides a domestic partnership registry that
carries little significance under state law.39'
How would the ILAOT decide the case of two registered New Jersey
domestic partners who, when one of them obtains a staff position at the ILO,
sell their home in New Jersey, relocate their lives to Geneva, but rent an
apartment in New York City to serve as their base in the United States? By
leaving their New Jersey residence, the couple loses the legal protections
accorded to their domestic partnership in that state. Is that a "volitional act"
under Van den Broeck, sufficient to disqualify them from equal treatment in
spousal benefits at the ILO? Does it make a difference if the couple has re-
registered their domestic partnership in New York City, which recognizes the
partnership but does not afford it legal rights equivalent to marriage?
It is strange that a person's legal rights to employment benefits on a par
with his or her similarly situated colleagues, in an international organization
that is not subject to national laws, would depend upon the vagaries of the
subnational laws in the country he has left behind. Hopefully this example
demonstrates the inadequacy of a legal test for equality that relies upon the law
of the place of nationality or residence to discriminate among otherwise
similarly situated staff members in the allocation of benefits associated with
marriage, de facto marriage, and equivalent relationships of commitment and
succor.
In conclusion, it may be said that the similarly situated test continues as the
dominant construct in the jurisprudence of the international administrative
tribunals, for cases of either simple inequality or true discrimination. But the
current test has been substantially innovated in some tribunals with the
additional requirement of a reasonable nexus between the organization's
legitimate purposes for differentiating and the extent of the differentiation in
term of employment and benefits.392 Nevertheless, there remains great
uncertainty about how the similarly situated test would be applied to various
circumstances in future cases, especially case of true discrimination as opposed
to simple inequality. This is partly due to the tribunals' reticence about
Tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (1999).
391 See Slattery v. City of New York, 697 N.Y.S.2d 603 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (city
ordinance establishing domestic partnership registry and granting certain benefits does not
impermissibly legislate in state sphere or conflict with state law or policy).
392 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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distinguishing or overturning precedents, or otherwise explaining their
reasoning in controversial cases.
C. The Irrelevant Personal Characteristics Test for Cases of True
Discrimination
Judge Hugessen, another dissenter in Mr. R.A.-O., was quoted at the start
of this Article.393 Hugessen, a Canadian, wrote that "the time has come" to
discontinue the use of the similarly situated test in cases of true
discrimination.394 The same conclusion had been reached fourteen years
earlier by the Supreme Court of Canada, in the seminal Andrews case.3 95
1. Andrews and the Canadian Testfor lrrelevant Personal Characteristics
The concept of "irrelevant personal characteristics" as an element of
employment discrimination analysis was developed by Canadian courts.
Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that:
"Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the
equal protection of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex,
age or mental or physical disability."'3 96
Interpreting Section 15(1), many lower Canadian courts had used a
similarly situated test much like that seen in the ECJ and the international
administrative tribunals, reflecting the formalist conception of equal
treatment. 397 But in 1989, in the case of Andrews, the Supreme Court of
Canada discarded that test and embraced a substantive conception of equality
before the law. Justice McIntyre explained, in a concurring opinion:
'9' See supra note 1.
194 Mr. R.A.-O., I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2193, 18 (2003) (Hugessen, J.,
dissenting).
'9' Law Soc'y of B.C. v. Andrews, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (Can.) (holding
that citizenship requirement for membership in the British Columbia bar is discriminatory under
Section 15(1) of the Charter and not "demonstrably justified" under Section 1 of the Charter).
396 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, ch. 11, § 15(1)
(U.K.).
39' Andrews, 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 9 (McIntyre, J., concurring with respect to Section 15(1);
dissenting from the judgment with respect to Section 1).
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The [similarly situated] test ... is seriously deficient in that it
excludes any consideration of the nature of the law. If it were to
be applied literally, it could be used to justify the Nuremberg
laws of Adolph Hitler. Similar treatment was contemplated for
all Jews. The similarly-situated test would have justified the
formalistic separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson 163
U.S. 637 (1896) (citation omitted) . . . [M]ere equality of
application to similarly situated groups or individuals does not
afford a realistic test for a violation of equality rights .... [A]
bad law will not be saved merely because it operates equally
upon those to whom it has application. Nor will a law
necessarily be bad because it makes distinctions. . . [T]he
[similarly situated] test cannot be accepted as a fixed rule or
formula for the resolution of equality questions arising under the
Charter. Consideration must be given to the content of the law,
to its purpose, and its impact upon those to whom it applies, and
also upon those whom it excludes from its application. The
issues which will arise from case to case are such that it would be
wrong to attempt to confine these considerations within such a
fixed and limited formula.398
In place of the similarly situated test, the Canadian court adopted an
"enumerated or analogous grounds" approach for expanding upon the list of
irrelevant personal characteristics set out in Section 15 of the Charter.399 This
approach had been used by Judge Hugessen on the Canadian federal court, and
by several provincial courts.400
In the Miron case,40' from 1995, the Canadian Supreme Court explained
that the test for "analogous grounds" of discriminating, to which strict scrutiny
applies under Section 15 of the Charter, is a flexible test. The Court will
consider whether the affected group is historically disadvantaged or a discrete
and insular minority,402 whether the distinction is based on immutable
'9' Id. 10-11 (opinion ofMclntyre, J., concurring with respect to Section 15(1); dissenting
from judgment with respect to Section 1).
399 Id. 28.
400 Id. 17.
401 Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418 17 (Can.).
402 This factor, borrowed from United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938), was cited favorably by the Canadian court in Andrews. Andrews, [1989] 1 S.C.R.
143, 31.
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characteristics and other personal characteristics, and whether the distinction
has been recognized by legislators as impermissible discrimination.4"' But the
Canadian court noted that none of these factors is decisive, pointing out that
sex is not a minority status, and religion is not immutable, yet both are
considered to be invidious grounds of discrimination." The court emphasized
that the principle of equality, as adopted in the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, protects human dignity and individual human rights, and not merely
equality of treatment:
Andrews instructs us that our approach must also reflect the
human rights background against which the Charter was
adopted. In evoking human rights law as the defining
characteristic of discrimination under s. 15(1) of the Charter, this
Court in Andrews engaged the principle of equality which
underlies the constitutions of free and democratic countries
throughout the world. This principle recognizes the dignity of
each human being and each person's freedom to develop his body
and spirit as he or she desires, subject to such limitations as may
be justified by the interests of the community as a whole....
The corollary of the recognition of the dignity of each
individual is the recognition of the wrong that lies in withholding
or limiting access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages
available to other members of society, solely on the ground that
the individual is a member of a particular group deemed to be
less able or meritorious than others. This is the evil we call
discrimination. °5
This emphasis on human dignity as the basic objective of the principle of
equality recalls the earlier influence of natural justice upon the Conseil
d'ttat.4°6 By the 1990s, the idea of human dignity as a cognizable right also
could be found in French and German constitutional law, labor law and penal
law.40
7
403 Miron, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, 141 (McLachlin, J., concurring).
404 Id. 159.
40' Id. 155-156.
o See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
1o7 See Friedman & Whitman, supra note 74, at 256-60.
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In Miron, the Canadian court made clear that it will apply strict scrutiny to
distinctions that are based on personal characteristics and other grounds that
are analogous to race, sex, nationality and the like.4°8 The Miron case involved
the claim by an unmarried couple for automobile accident benefits payable in
respect of a "spouse."4 °9  The Canadian court ruled that the personal
characteristic of being unmarried is an "analogous ground" of discrimination
that deserves strict scrutiny, because marital status touches on essential human
dignity and the freedom to live with the mate of one's choice, or not,
unmarried couples have been historically disadvantaged and ostracized, and
legislatures increasingly have abolished or minimized distinctions in legal
rights between married and unmarried couples.4 1 ° The court went on to hold
that there was no rational connection between the discrimination and the goal
of the automobile accident benefit legislation, and therefore, such
discrimination could not be demonstrably justified under the Charter.4 '
On the same day as the Miron case, the Canadian court unanimously held
in the Egan case that sexual orientation was an analogous ground under
Section 15 of the Charter because, "whether or not sexual orientation is based
on biological or physiological factors, which may be a matter of some
controversy, it is a deeply personal characteristic that is either unchangeable
or changeable only at unacceptable personal costs....""'
2. The Irrelevant Personal Characteristics Test in the ILOAT
After the ILOAT had been seized of the French PACS case of Mr. R.A.-O.
in 2002, but seven months before judgment was issued in that case, the tribunal
adopted an irrelevant personal characteristics test in another case dealing with
discrimination based on marital status.413 In the case of Mr. .MB.,4 14 the
ILOAT considered a policy of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) prohibiting the appointment of spouses within the same department.41 5
408 Miron, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 118, 141 (McLachlin, J., concurring).
409 Id. 3-6.
410 Id. 7 161-162, 165.
411 Id. 184.
412 Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 5 (Can.). In Egan, the court was deeply divided
over the question of whether the challenged legislation actually discriminated against
homosexuals, either directly or though adverse effect). Id.
411 Mr. I.M.B., I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2120 (2002).
414 Id.
415 Id.
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Judge Hugessen wrote that the policy "improperly discriminates between
candidates for appointment based on their marital status and family
relationship" and "[d]iscrimination on such grounds is contrary to the Charter
of the United Nations, general principles of law and those which govern the
international civil service, as well as international instruments on human
rights," citing Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (1966).416
In language reminiscent of the Canadian Supreme Court opinions in
Andrews and in Miron, the ILOAT continued:
[A]ll forms of improper discrimination are prohibited. What is
improper discrimination? It is, at least in the employment
context, the drawing of distinctions between staff members or
candidates for appointment on the basis of irrelevant personal
characteristics. Manifestly, the fact that two staff members may
be married to each other is not relevant to their competence or the
capacity of either one of them to fulfill their obligations. And, if
it is thought that marital or intimate personal relationships
between staff members may create management problems, such
problems must be dealt with in ways that do not discriminate
against either of them as a result of such relationships. The
Tribunal notes that [the policy] as it is written, besides being too
broad, is not even effective in dealing with the presumed
possibility of undue influence or favoritism for it is silent on non-
marital [sic] intimate relationships. It also fails to deal with
marriages taking place after appointment which are specifically
protected by the terms of [staff rules].417
The ILOAT, thus, laid out a two-step analysis of improper discrimination
going well beyond the similarly situated test for equal treatment. First, there
is recognition that some employment classifications deserve a stricter analysis,
namely, classifications based on characteristics that are irrelevant to
competence or capacity, and personal to the individual, going to their human
dignity.4 18 In Mr. LMB., it is suggested that not only marriage but also other
416 Id. 10.
417 id. 1 1.
418 Id.
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forms of intimate personal relationships constitute such irrelevant personal
characteristics that are deserving of such stricter scrutiny.4" 9
Second, there is a requirement of correspondence, or nexus, between the
differential treatment and the difference between the affected categories of
staff.421 Mr. I.MB. indicates that, when irrelevant personal characteristics are
in issue, the ILOAT will apply a stricter scrutiny than the reasonable
relationship test seen in earlier ILOAT cases like Tarrab, and perhaps the
WBAT and IMFAT cases applying the reasonable relationship test.42' With
irrelevant personal characteristics at issue, the ILOAT looked not simply for
a nexus, or a reasonable nexus, but for a nexus that is neither too broad nor too
narrow, perhaps suggesting that the principle of proportionality or a kind of
strict scrutiny is at work.
4 22
This framework is subject to criticism on a number of fronts. The first
element is not a rigorous test for irrelevant personal characteristics. The
ILOAT's test opens the door to claims based upon all manner of personal
characteristics, regardless of whether such characteristics traditionally have
been viewed as legitimate grounds for differentiation among employees or,
conversely, have been a traditional basis for prejudicial treatment.423 For
example, expatriate status is a criterion that seems to satisfy the test for an
irrelevant personal characteristic, in that it is irrelevant to the staff member's
competence to perform his job and arguably a matter of human dignity. Yet
to apply strict scrutiny to international organizations' differentiation based on
expatriate status potentially could play havoc with their longstanding, treaty-
based policies on expatriate benefits.
419 Id.
420 Id.
42 See Mould, W.B. Admin. Trib., Decision No. 210 (1999), supra note 164 and
accompanying text; Mr. "R", I.M.F. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2002-1, supra note 169 and
accompanying text.
422 Mr. I.M.B., I.L.O. Admin. Trib. , Judgment No. 2120, 10 (2002).
423 Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has accepted a long list of "other
statuses," such as military rank and profession of work, to which it will apply scrutiny under
Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. See CLAYTON & TOMLINSON, supra
note 22, at 1240-41. It seems to demean the prestige of human rights, and the tremendous
struggles of women, racial and religious minorities, and other persecuted and historically
disadvantaged groups, to set no limits on the comparators to which the human right of equal
treatment applies, such that, for example, servicemen in the armed forces can claim a human
right to treatment equal to officers as regards penalties for their violations of military rules.
Engel v. Neth., 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 647 (1976).
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The second element of the framework, that the nexus must not be too broad
nor too narrow, may not adequately take into account the different interests at
play in various contexts. The ILOAT's judgment in Mr. LMB. seems to build
upon the Canadian approach to personal characteristics in employment actions,
but without the Canadian balance between employee and employer interests.424
For example, it is difficult to understand why the IAEA would have to relocate
out of the work unit one employee in a couple that has begun an intimate
relationship or become married, simply to legitimize the rule against placing
married employees together in the same unit. When two staff who already
work together begin an intimate personal relationship or get married, for the
organization to move one of those employees out of the unit could entail a
significant disruption to the work unit and to the career of that employee. In
contrast, when choosing among qualified candidates to fill a vacant position,
not selecting the candidate who is married to a colleague in the work unit
would entail no additional disruption to the work unit or to the career of the
employee who was not selected.
In any event, having articulated in the case of Mr. LM.B. a new and
important substantive test for improper discrimination involving personal
characteristics, the ILOAT failed to apply that test seven months later in its
judgment in Mr. R.A.-O. As discussed above, that judgment denying spousal
benefits to an employee in a French PACS was based on an interpretation of
the word "spouse" and a formalistic application of the similarly situated test.425
Writing in dissent in Mr. R.A-O., Judge Hugessen refined the irrelevant
personal characteristics test for use in cases involving true discrimination. He
wrote:
First, it should be determined whether the challenged decision
or rule has drawn a distinction between a staff member and
others based on irrelevant personal characteristics, such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, marital or other status. To be clear,
this list is not exhaustive. Secondly, the inquiry must focus
on whether the distinction (or differential treatment) has the
effect of imposing a burden, obligation or disadvantage not
imposed upon other staff members or of withholding or
424 See Law Soc'y of B.C. v. Andrews, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 56 D.L.R. 4th 1, 10-11
(Can.), supra note 395 and accompanying text.
425 Mr. R.A.-O., I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2193, T 10 (2003).
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limiting access to benefits or advantages which are available
to others. Thirdly, the inquiry will determine whether, despite
all the above, there are sound administrative reasons for the
difference in treatment or if the differential treatment is a fair,
reasonable and logical outcome of circumstantial
differences.426
Applying this test to the complainant's domestic partnership, Judge
Hugessen concluded as to the first prong that the staff rule did distinguish
based on an irrelevant personal characteristic, specifically, sexual
orientation.427 Although eligibility for the dependency benefit turned on
marital status, the effect was to distinguish based on sexual orientation. As
Judge Hugessen observed, "[S]urely the only difference in the situation of two
couples each legally committed in principle to a lifetime of mutual support and
succour where one of the couples is gay and the other is not is that fact
alone."428 At the time, sexual orientation was not an explicitly protected
classification under the non-discrimination policies of the UN common system.
Nevertheless, Judge Hugessen characterized same sex couples as a "highly
vulnerable social group" due to the "historic disadvantage, stereotyping,
marginalization and stigmatization suffered by homosexuals."429 He thus
analogized sexual orientation to other protected classifications, such as sex,
nationality and race. This technique for expanding the range of protected
classifications, by reference to social ostracism and historic disadvantage,
clearly recalls the Canadian jurisprudence under section 15 of the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, discussed above, as well as Ruth Bader Ginsberg's
argument to the United States Supreme Court in the Frontiero case.43 °
Interestingly, Judge Hugessen did not invoke the American or Canadian
cases in his dissenting opinion, but instead referred to the European
Parliament's two resolutions on equal rights for gays and lesbians from 1994
and 1998.431 It says much about the aversion of IGOs generally, and the
international administrative tribunals in particular, to explicit comparisons to
426 Id. 27 (Hugessen, J., dissenting).
427 Id. 28 (Hugessen, J., dissenting).
428 Id. 20 (Hugessen, J., dissenting).
429 Id. 30 (Hugessen, J., dissenting).
430 See supra note 248 and accompanying text. American state courts and Canadian
provincial courts that recognized equality rights for same sex couples have similarly referred to
the social ostracism and historic disadvantage of sexual minorities. See supra note 384.
431 Mr. R.A.-O., I.L.O. No. 2193, 30 (Hugessen, J., dissenting).
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or reliance upon municipal law, that Judge Hugessen thought these resolutions
of the European Parliament would carry greater persuasive force than binding
judgments of the highest court in his own country. 32
As to the second prong, Judge Hugessen found that the distinction, based
on marital status, in eligibility for the dependency benefit obviously did
impose a disadvantage upon the staff member in a same sex partnership that
was not imposed upon other staff members. Specifically, because of his sexual
orientation, the homosexual staff member was denied access to benefits for his
partner that were available to married heterosexual staff members.433
Judge Hugessen's third prong, which was a new element to the test after the
judgment in Mr. I.MB., seems to bring in a balancing of employer and
employee interests that is also seen in the Canadian jurisprudence. However,
when applying this prong to the case of Mr. R.A.-O., Judge Hugessen opined
that it was not possible to imagine any justifiable reasons UNESCO might
have for discriminating against the complainant based on his same sex
relationship:
When determining whether a decision or rule discriminates
against a staff member on grounds of sexual orientation, focus
should not be on the economic aims and origins of the prohibition
against such discrimination in the workplace, but rather on the
dignity of the individual and the value of equality as a
fundamental human right recognised as such by national legal
systems.434
Judge Hugessen's analysis under the third prong of his test could be faulted
for inadequately considering the organization's sound reasons for the
difference in treatment, assuming the organization plead sound reasons. It is
432 Some American judges and many American legislators have a similar aversion to reliance
upon foreign or international law. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (faulting the majority for "dangerous dicta" that referred to foreign and international
judgments rejecting laws against intimate same sex conduct). See Diane Marie Amann,
International Law and Rehnquist-Era Reversals, 94 GEo. L.J. 1319 (2006) (discussing the role
of international law in Lawrence and other Supreme Court cases, and the backlash including
congressional calls to impeach the justices). This aversion contrasts with practice in
Commonwealth countries, where courts readily cite to United States judgments on equal
treatment. See CLAYTON & TOMLINSON, supra note 22, at 120-21.
413 Mr. R.A.-O., I.L.O. No. 2193, 32 (Hugessen, J., dissenting).
414 Id. 39 (Hugessen, J., dissenting).
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not clear from the judgment in this case whether UNESCO faced the same
uproar over same sex benefits that was seen in the UN General Assembly in
the UNAT's Adrian case,435 or made the argument that some of its member
states were opposed to the measures. If it did, then the question of an IGO's
obligation to respect the views of its member states, whether or not those views
hold a majority, deserves a fair hearing under this third prong.436
3. The IMFAT and Cases of True Discrimination
The IMFAT recently had two occasions to analyze claims of true
discrimination, one alleging hostility because of religion,437 and the other
claiming discrimination based on marital status.438 In both cases, the tribunal
recognized a distinction between, on the one hand, the right to equal treatment,
and on the other hand, the "principle of nondiscrimination that implicates
'universally accepted principles of human rights.' ""'
In the case of Mr. "F", the plaintiff alleged that he was subjected to a
hostile and discriminatory work environment because of his religion, and that
the abolition of his job position was motivated by that discrimination." In a
work unit devoted to language translation, where most colleagues shared the
plaintiff's ethnic background and professed the majority religion, he adhered
to a minority religion.441 Creed is one of the enumerated grounds for which
discrimination is expressly prohibited by the Staff Regulations of the IMF. 442
The IMFAT immediately recognized that the claim in this case involved
an invidious form of discrimination, compared to the "distinctly different and
less serious type[s]" of discrimination alleged in its earlier cases. 43 However,
the tribunal disposed of the plaintiff's complaint about the abolition of his job
in rather summary fashion, noting there was no evidence that the decision
431 See supra note 362 and accompanying text.
436 See Adrian, U.N. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 1183 (2004); BENNET & OLIVER, supra
note 256, at 423 ("[UN employee has] 180 bosses to please in addition to his or her supervisors
in the Secretariat hierarchy.").
437 Mr. "F", I.M.F. Admin. Trib. Judgment No. 2005-1.
411 Ms. "M" & Dr. "M", I.M.F. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2006-6.
439 Id. 124 (citing Mr. "F", I.M.F. Judgment No. 2005-1, 81).
44' See Mr. "F", I.M.F. No. 2005-1, 2.
44 Id. 19.
442 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
443 Mr. "F", I.M.F. No. 2005-1, 81 (comparing D'Aoust, I.M.F. Admin. Trib., Judgment
No. 1996-1, Mr. "R", I.M.F. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2002-1, and Ms. "G", I.M.F. Admin.
Trib., Judgment No. 2002-3).
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maker, who was not part of the work unit where the alleged harassment
occurred and who shared the plaintiff's religious affiliation, was motivated by
religious discrimination.4 "
As to the complaint of hostile and discriminatory work environment, the
IMFAT ruled in the plaintiff's favor, finding that harassment did occur and the
managers failed their duties under the organization's policy against harassment
to "take adequate measures to rectify." 5 Because this portion of the decision
was based upon the organization's written policy, the analysis did not rely
upon general principles of equality. However, in what may be viewed as a nod
to the moral element of the general principle of equality, the IMFAT in dicta
referred to religious prejudice as "a source of discrimination prohibited by the
Fund's internal law as well as by universally accepted principles of human
rights."" 6
The IMFAT again invoked general principles of human rights law in the
case of Ms. "M" and Dr. "M". 447 There, the plaintiffs appealed the denial of
their request that the IMF pension plan give effect to a court order for
deduction of child support from the pension of an IMF retiree." Like most
pension plans based in the United States, the IMF pension has a rule allowing
court-ordered child support to be deducted from a pension in specified
circumstances. 449 As originally adopted, the IMF's rule required that such
deductions arise from a "marital relationship," thus precluding deductions for
palimony or child support where there was no marriage. 450 The plaintiffs'
request initially was denied on the basis that the pensioner was never married
to Dr. "M", the mother of Ms. "M", to whom the support was owed.451
However, the IMF then amended its rule to accommodate their situation, and
a new request was submitted.452 Nevertheless, the new request also was denied
due to technical deficiencies in the court order and opposition from the
pensioner.453
44 Mr. "F", I.M.F. No. 2005-1,1 90.
441 Id. 9 100-101.
44 Id. 81.
447 See Ms. "M" & Dr. "M", I.M.F. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2006-6.
448 Id. 1.
449 Id. 53 n.43.
450 Id.
451 Id. 55.
452 Id. $$ 57-58.
453 Id. 961.
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The IMFAT reversed both denials, and awarded the child support
deductions with interest from the date of the initial denial, finding that the
faults in the court order were not material, and that the original rule requiring
a marital relationship was a discriminatory violation of general principles of
law.454 In reaching its conclusion on the question of discrimination, the
IMFAT recalled the burden shifting framework it had applied in Mr. "R " and
Ms. "G ".4' As it had done it those prior cases, the IMFAT evaluated the
process by which the rule was adopted, and noted that no consideration had
been given to the severe effect of the "marital relationship" requirement upon
children born out of wedlock.456  The tribunal indicated that, whatever
justification the organization had for the "marital relationship" rule to
distinguish between court-ordered alimony versus palimony, there was no
reasonable basis for distinguishing in the enforcement of child support orders
between children from a marriage versus children outside a marriage.457
Then the IMFAT went further. Perhaps to reinforce the outcome it already
had reached, the tribunal recalled Mr. "F" and emphasized that this case
implicates principles of human rights. 458 The tribunal endorsed the ILOAT's
judgment in Mr. I.MB., where marital status was held to be an irrelevant
personal characteristic, and the ILOAT had overturned differentiation on that
basis as a violation of general principles of human rights, including Article 26
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). 459
However, the IMFAT did not expressly adopt an irrelevant characteristics
test or any explicit innovation to the framework it had applied in Mr. "R " and
Ms. "G", where human rights were not at issue. Rather, the INEAT merely
observed that Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, from
1948, protects the equal rights of "[a]ll children, whether born in or out of
wedlock. '461 In light of this general principle of human rights law, the tribunal
concluded that, "while the terms of the provision in question may have been
understandable, they nevertheless cannot be sustained.,
46
'
In summary, whereas international administrative tribunals for years had
made innovations to the similarly situated test in order to adapt the test to
414 Id. 130-133.
411 Id. 128.
456 Id. 131.
411 Id. 130.
458 Id. 124.
419 Id. 125.
460 Id. 133.
461 Id.
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problematic cases, the ILOAT judgment in Mr. LMB. and Judge Hugessen's
dissent in Mr. R.A.-O. make a clear break with that tradition. Those opinions
introduce a substantive conception of equality grounded in the dignity and
worth of the individual person, and suggest a closer degree of scrutiny for
cases of discrimination based on irrelevant personal characteristics. However,
the ILOAT has cast doubt upon the vitality of the irrelevant personal
characteristics test, by its failure to apply that test in judgments concerning
claims for spousal benefits in respect of same sex couples. For its part, the
IMFAT similarly distinguished cases involving personal characteristics
affecting human dignity from other equal treatment cases, but has not
articulated a closer degree of scrutiny for those cases.
V. SYNTHESIS: A UNIFYING SUBSTANTIVE FRAMEWORK
For international administrative tribunals, there is an inherent weakness in
a principle of equality that purports to draw legitimacy from its universality,
but is applied to divergent circumstances within disparate organizations by
different tribunals that are under no formal obligation to promulgate a coherent
jurisprudence. If nothing else, the preceding review of the equality
jurisprudence in the international civil service demonstrates the need for some
of the tribunals to more fully explain their reasoning, in order to promote the
legitimacy of this general principle of law. Moreover, it is hoped that the cases
demonstrates that, while much less articulated than equivalent doctrines in the
jurisprudence of some member states, and far from perfect, the equality
jurisprudence of the international administrative tribunals has adapted the
similarly situated test into a sophisticated and capable analytical construct.
However, there remains the dual risks that, in cases of simple unequal
treatment, the similarly situated test as applied by the tribunals treads too
heavily upon the reasonable choices by the policymaking organs of the
organization, even while the test does not get to the heart of the problem in
cases of true discrimination. In the former cases, a less probing inquiry may
be adequate, while a more substantial legal framework-such as the personal
characteristics test-is clearly needed in the latter cases.
Rather than being viewed as competing tests, the similarly situated test and
the personal characteristics test should be seen as distinct branches within a
unified framework for tackling equality cases. Elements of such a unified
framework can be found in the burden-shifting analysis from the IMFAT
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judgment in Mr. "R""62 and its progeny, in the ILOAT's judgment in Mr.
I.MB.463 and Judge Hugessen's dissenting opinion in Mr. R.A.-O.
464
It is proposed that the first step in a comprehensive framework, as in the
case of Mr. "R , 65 from the IMFAT and the EBRDAT's decision in Mr. C,
466
would be for the plaintiff to show that the organization distinguishes in its
treatment among individuals or categories of staff. That is the prima facie
showing of unequal treatment, and it is not an onerous burden.
The second step, again in line with Mr. "R,, 467 and Ms. C,468 is for the
organization to state a legitimate purpose for the differential treatment and to
produce evidence that the differential treatment is rationally related to those
purposes. That step resembles the burden upon the defendant under the
Canadian Charter to show that the discrimination is "demonstrably justified,"
what U.K. courts and many European courts would call "objectivelyjustified,"
or what U.S. courts would term a "business necessity.
469
The third step is the tribunal's degree of scrutiny. At this step, the path
should diverge according to Judge Hugessen's distinction between
"discrimination as opposed to simple inequality. 4 7 To respect the natural
justice aspect of the principle of equality, without unduly interfering in the
discretionary business decisions of the organizations, it is necessary to apply
a relatively strict standard of review in some cases even while giving more
deferential scrutiny to others. Much of the jurisprudence supports this
distinction, even while not acknowledging it.
462 Mr. "R", I.M.F. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2002-1, supra note 169 and accompanying
text.
463 Mr. I.M.B., I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2120 (2002), supra note 413 and
accompanying text.
464 Mr. R.A.O., I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2193 (2003) (Hugessen, J., dissenting),
supra note 426 and accompanying text.
465 Mr. "R ", I.M.F. No. 2002-1.
466 Mr. "C", E.B.R.D. Admin. Trib., 0 1/03 (2004), supra note 310 and accompanying text.
467 Mr. "R ", I.M.F. No. 2002-1.
468 Mr. "C", E.B.R.D. 01/03.
469 For comparisons between U.S. and U.K. approaches in this regard, see Shari Engels,
Problems ofProofin Employment Discrimination: The Needfor Clearer Definition ofStandards
in the United States and the United Kingdom, 15 COMP. LAB. L.J. 340 (1994). The early cases
on the "objectively justified" rule in the European Court of Human Rights and the European
Court of Justice are the Belgian Linguistic case (case "Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws
on The Use of Languages in Education in Bel."), 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 252 (ser. A) 1968, and
Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455.
470 Mr. R.A.-O., I.L.O. Admin Trib., Judgment No. 2193, 18 (2003) (Hugessen, J.,
dissenting).
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To implement such a distinction, it is necessary to know where to draw the
line between discrimination and simple inequality. IGOs could legislate this
line, as in Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and
in U.S. legislation like the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Thus, where
organizations have legislated that expatriate status is not an invidious
classification, the tribunals should respect that and apply the more deferential
review to distinctions on that basis. Such deference was seen in the IMFAT's
focus on the process rather than the substance of the decision in Ms. "G",47 1
and in much of the analysis in the AsDBAT's case of De Armas.4 2
Absent guidance from the legislative organs of the IGOs, the ILOAT's
judgment in Mr. I.MB.4 73 usefully singles out distinctions based on irrelevant
personal characteristics for special scrutiny. Reflecting the Canadian approach
to invidious and "analogous" classifications, the ILOAT's test as elaborated
in Judge Hugessen's dissent in Mr. R.A.-O., would hold out such
classifications as sex, race, nationality and marital status as discriminatory, and
therefore, deserving of a stricter degree of review.474
Turning to the degree of scrutiny for reviewing cases of simple inequality,
the IMFAT's judgments in Mr. "R "and Ms. "G" are instructive. In both cases
case, there was no allegation in the nature of invidious discrimination.
Therefore, the tribunal focused very much on the organization's process in
reaching the decision to differentiate as it did. While hasty or ill-considered
decisions would not per se violate the principle of equality-for example,
where the difference in circumstance is obvious and relevant-a well-informed
and thoroughly considered decision to differentiate among categories of staff
would be entitled to substantial deference.47 5 In particular, it is suggested that
under this lesser degree of review, once a tribunal has found that the
organization had good reasons for making a non-invidious classification, it
should inquire no further; the tribunal should not question whether the extent
471 Ms. "G", I.M.F. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2002-3, supra note 299 and accompanying
text.
472 De Armas, As. D.B. Admin. Trib., Decision No. 39 (1998), supra note 260 and
accompanying text.
473 Mr. I.M.B., I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2120 (2002), supra note 413 and
accompanying text.
474 Mr. R.A.-O., I.L.O. No. 2193, 1 27 (Hugessen, J., dissenting).
475 See Mr. "R", I.M.F. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2002-1, 62-63 ("In the Tribunal's
view, the Applicant's contentions are far from frivolous... But however comprehensible the
Applicant's position, this judgment call was not his but that of Fund management to make....
The manner of arriving at the decision taken was deliberate and within the Fund's managerial
authority.").
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of the differential treatment is substantively fair or proportionate in light of
that classification. Arguably, the IMFAT's dicta in D'Aoust and Mr. "R"
indicated a more probing analysis, but the tribunal seemed to pull back in Ms.
"G ", acknowledging that where there is more than one reasonable approach
the organization has authority to choose among them.476
In circumstances of true discrimination, the cases support a more rigorous
inquiry into the legitimacy of the organization's asserted purpose for making
the distinction, and the reasonableness of the degree of differential treatment.
In their groundbreaking judgments in Sabbatini, and Rabozge, the ECJ and the
ILOAT, respectively, doubted that actual differences between the legal and
economic status of men and women were relevant to the organizations'
asserted purposes for differentiating between the benefits paid to men and
women.4 77 In Mr. LMB., the judgment that introduced the irrelevant personal
characteristics test, the ILOAT plainly engaged in a critical evaluation of the
substance of the organization's asserted purpose for treating married couples
differently from unmarried persons in the same work unit.478 In the cases of
Mrs. A.H.R.C.-J and Mr. D.B., the ILOAT seemed to doubt that the subtle
differences between domestic partnership and marriage under Danish and
German laws should be relevant to the organization's purposes for
differentiating between the benefits paid to a married employee and one in a
domestic partnership and whether the complete denial of benefits to the latter
class bore a reasonable relation to those subtle differences in circumstance. 79
Most recently, in the case of Ms. "M" and Dr. "M", the IMFAT critically
evaluated the asserted purpose of the challenged differentiation, and found that
the organization had no rational purpose for treating children from a marriage
differently from children outside a marriage, in its recognition of child support
orders.4"'
It is necessary to reconcile these two degrees of review with those
judgments, such as the judgment in Mr. C from the EBRDAT, in which
tribunals seemed to apply the more probing analysis in circumstances that
476 See Ms. "G", I.M.F. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2002-3, supra note 299 and
accompanying text.
411 See Case 20/71, Sabbatini v. European Parl., 1972 E.C.R. 345, supra note 209 and
accompanying text; Rabozre, I.L.O. Admin. Trib., JudgmentNo. 204 (1975), supra note 232 and
accompanying text.
471 Mr. I.M.B., I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2120 (2002), supra note 413 and
accompanying text.
479 See Mrs. A.H.R.C.-J., I.L.O. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2549 (2000).
480 See Ms. "M" & Dr. "M", I.M.F. Admin. Trib., Judgment No. 2006-6.
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supposedly did not involve invidious classifications.4"' The case of Mr. C
involved distinctions based on expatriate status.4 2 The same distinctions were
at issue in De Armas from the AsDBAT, which emphasized that such
differentiation is not tantamount to discrimination based on nationality.8 3 The
EBRDAT, in contrast, expressly held that the European Bank's expatriate
benefits policies did discriminate based on nationality.4 84 Such a finding is
highly controversial, particularly in view of the organization's constitutional
mandate of geographical distribution, but could be justified by the severe
effects of the differential treatment along national lines, even in the absence
of direct proof of a discriminatory purpose.485  By making a finding of
discrimination on the apparently invidious ground of nationality, the EBRDAT
established the basis to move from a deferential scrutiny to a more probing
analysis. Under the proposed construct, even if the plaintiffs prima facie
showing does not establish that the organization's classification is an invidious
one, tribunals should be vigilant for evidence that such classification is the
purpose or effect, and apply the more stringent degree of review upon such a
finding.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
International administrative tribunals face a challenging task but an
intriguing jurisprudential opportunity in crafting the legal framework for
assessing claims of discrimination in the international civil service. In the
absence of clear guidance or restraints from the legislative organs of the
international organizations, the tribunals have for decades been relatively free
to ponder and perfect their analytical approach to equality as a general
481 Mr. "C", E.B.R.D. Admin. Trib. 01/03 (2003).
482 Id.
483 De Armas, As. D.B. Admin. Trib., Decision No. 39 (1998).
484 Mr. C, E.B.R.D. 01/03, 83.
485 See Espinoza v. Forah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973). See Marie, I.L.O. Admin. Trib.,
Judgment No. 818 (1987) (while dismissing challenge to seniority rules because plaintiff
suffered no injury, tribunal cautioned that it would apply closer scrutiny in some circumstances:
"The Tribunal will of course consider also whether the purpose or even the mere effect of the
rule is to put some members of the staff at a severe disadvantage. If the new method of
reckoning seniority did have that effect the Tribunal would have to see whether it was warranted
by broader considerations, the Organisation being allowed a large degree of discretion in the
matter."). It is submitted that strict scrutiny should apply where invidious discrimination based
on sex, race, nationality and the like can be inferred from the severely disproportionate effects
of a seniority system.
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principle of law. However, the tribunals have comparatively few opportunities
to develop this jurisprudence, and they have not always seized those chances
to elaborate a coherent framework. This, coupled with the fact that the
tribunals are not bound by each others' precedents, has resulted in divergent
approaches to this general principle of law, with no tribunal consistently
applying either a formalist or a substantive framework. The result is a lack of
predictability in the application of the principle of equality in the international
civil service.
This Article shows that a unified and substantive framework can be found
in the tribunals' own judgments which, in turn, have borrowed from both
European and North American jurisprudence. But this more comprehensive
framework requires the tribunals to make a fundamental break with their past
reliance on the formalist similarly situated test for analyzing cases of both true
discrimination and simple inequality.
When invidious discrimination based on irrelevant personal characteristics
is a purpose of the organization's classification of its employees or such
purpose can be inferred from the effects of the classification, as in Sabbatini
or Mr. R.A.-O., then the international administrative tribunals should
acknowledge the close scrutiny they will give to the organization's asserted
justifications and to the necessity of the discriminatory means. The tribunals
should engage in close substantive scrutiny with consistency and transparency.
Not every such classification will fail this close scrutiny, and one tribunal may
yet rule differently than another on similar circumstances. But a more
thoroughly reasoned, substantive approach should yield more credible and
sustainable outcomes in controversial cases, and greater transparency in the
analysis will afford certainty and predictability benefiting all parties.
Conversely, when the claim is for simple unequal treatment between
similarly situated coworkers, as in De Los Cobos or Mr. "R," the tribunals
should continue to acknowledge the authority of the legislative and
administrative bodies in the IGOs to make such distinctions reasonably. But
the tribunals should more clearly and consistently refrain from close scrutiny
of the organizations' means for implementing reasonable distinctions.
By adopting a unified analytical construct that acknowledges different legal
tests should apply to cases of discrimination versus those of simple inequality,
the international administrative tribunals could greatly improve the legal
certainty, predictability and thus, the credibility of equality as a general
principle of law in the international civil service.
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